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NOTE
"PUBLIC CITIZENS" AND THE
CONSTITUTION: BRIDGING THE GAP
BETWEEN POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND
ORIGINAL INTENT
Robert W. Schef,
I sincerely congratulate the citizens of America upon the fair
prospect which now presents itself to their view; and promises a long
reign of virtue, happiness, and glory, as the result of a constitution
which is the real vox populi so often ardently desired by mankind, in
vain, and now, for the first time, discovered by the patriotic sages of
America.1
INTRODUCTION
"A Real Patriot's" congratulatory note to the citizens of America
highlights two points regarding the creation of the Constitution. First,
it was the people who had the right to establish the fundamental law
upon which government was based. As Thomas Jefferson declared in
the Declaration of Independence, it was the people's right "to alter or
to abolish" government, and "to institute new government" to secure
fundamental rights to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 2
Second, the true voice of the people was not directly expressed by the
"citizens of America," but was rather "discovered" by "patriotic
sages." Just as representation was an inherent part of colonial
assemblies, state governments, and the Continental Congress,' so was
* I would like to thank Professor Martin Flaherty for his invaluable guidance and
insight. I would also like to thank Michael Whidden and Jaimee Campbell for their
comments and suggestions, and my family for their unending support.
1. "A Real Patriot," Pa. Mercury, Feb. 26, 1788, reprinted in 16 The
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 118, 119 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) [hereinafter Documentary History].
2. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
3. The Continental Congress was an assembly of representatives from all the
colonies (except Georgia) first organized in 1774 to protest Parliament's heavy-
handed regulation of British America. See Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History
of the American People 206-11 (1965). The Second Continental Congress assembled
in 1775 (this time including Georgia) to continue to protest British policy, and when
reconciliation became impossible, to govern the conduct of the war for independence.
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it a part of the making of the Constitution. The notion that the voice
of the people was "discovered," however, begs the question of
whether the Constitution has any greater claim to being the voice of
"We the People", as the preamble states, than an ordinary piece of
legislation.
Originalists think it does. In The Tempting of America, Judge
Robert Bork argues that "only the approach of original understanding
meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must
meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy. Only that approach is
consonant with the design of the American Republic."4  The
democratic legitimacy of originalism is based on the idea that the
Constitution was written and adopted through a process that was
more deliberative, and required the approval of a greater majority of
the people, than was required from the normal acts of a legislature.5
Professor Martin Flaherty explained the essential argument:
Since "We the People" ratify constitutional provisions and later
generations govern themselves within the framework of that law,
these later generations must follow the command of the "People"
unless one of those generations successfully amends the Constitution
and so acts as the "People" in its own right.6
Therefore, until a supermajority of the people once again join to
deliberate and change the Constitution, the prior understanding
controls. Yet when originalists seek an understanding of the original
"We the People"-the generation that adopted the original
Constitution and its first ten amendments-they inevitably resort to
the writings and recorded speeches of the political leaders and
engaged citizens of the period.7 This is, of course, understandable,
because the historical records of the late eighteenth-century do not
Id. at 215-23; see also infra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
4. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 143 (1990).
5. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725,
1745-46 (1996) ("The most obvious devotion to the past issues from thinkers who
stress the Constitution's commitment to democracy."); Abner S. Greene, The
Irreducible Constitution, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 293, 295-96 (1996) (characterizing
democratic foundationalist theory as focusing on "decisions by the people acting
collectively" and citing originalists as supporters of this theory).
6. Martin S. Flaherty, History in Constitutional Argumentation, in 3 Encyclopedia
of the American Constitution 1290, 1291 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds.,
2d ed. 2000).
7. Not all originalists go this far. As Professor Flaherty has pointed out,
"Americans love to invoke history, but not necessarily to learn it.... For better and
for worse, a similar theme of allure and apathy characterizes the work of
constitutional 'professionals."' Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern
American Constitutionalism, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 523, 523-24 (1995). Some originalists
stop at The Federalist Papers or the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. Compare Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 910-15, 920-23 (1997) (discussing arguments in The
Federalist Papers and ratification debates), with id. at 971-76 (Souter, J., dissenting)
("In deciding these cases, which I have found closer than I had anticipated, it is The
Federalist that finally determines my position.").
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extend much beyond these "public citizens." However, judges,
lawyers, and legal scholars are still left with determining the
understanding of "We the People" from the records of a political elite.
As brilliant as James Madison was, brilliance alone cannot establish
that his intent was the People's intent.8
As a participant in both the framing and ratification of the
Constitution, Madison might provide a reasonable basis for
interpreting the Constitution if what originalism sought was
equivalent to legislative intent. Justice Scalia, however, at least
implicitly acknowledged that "legislative intent"-that is, the intent of
the drafters and ratifiers of legislation (i.e., Congress) - is sufficiently
different from the intent of the drafters and ratifiers of the
Constitution to repudiate the former and embrace the latter? This
distinction raises the question of the nature of popular sovereignty in
America. Professor Bruce Ackerman differentiates times when "We
the People" set down constitutional, or higher law, from times when
through the legislative process elected representatives of the people
enact statutory, or ordinary law." He calls this a "dualist
democracy."" Ackerman uses this theory to support a broad theory
of constitutional lawmaking outside Article V12 of the Constitution.13
Yet at all times, during periods of either higher or ordinary
lawmaking, the same representatives are acting.
Originalists have been criticized for failing to consider the ulterior
& Cf Martin S. Flaherty, The Practice of Faith, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1565, 1573
(1997).
9. Compare Printz, 521 U.S. at 910 (discussing The Federalist as one "source[]
we have usually regarded as indicative of the original understanding of the
Constitution"), with Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 622 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (objecting to "the practice of utilizing legislative history for the
purpose of giving authoritative content to the meaning of a statutory text").
10. 1 Bruce Ackerman, "We the People": Foundations 6-7 (1991). This Note does
not suggest that Justice Scalia agrees with Professor Ackerman's dualist democracy,
only that their approaches are similar. See Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1568 ("The more
one ponders dualist theory, the harder it becomes to distinguish it from the approach
claimed, if not practiced, by Antonin Scalia.").
11. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 3.
12. Article V states:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of
the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention
for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all
Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in
three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be
made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any
Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first
Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate.
U.S. Const. art. V.
13. Id
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motives of, and inconsistent arguments made by, the Founders14 when
using the historical record to support a constitutional argument.,5
Ackerman has been criticized for failing to explain his use of the
statements of political elites to support his theory of higher lawmaking
by populist movements.1 6 Both criticisms essentially point to a single
problem: the gap between popular sovereignty-the voice of "We the
People", and original intent-the statements of those public citizens
who speak for the People. This Note attempts to bridge that gap by
defining the role of public citizens in the higher lawmaking process.
Part I examines the history leading up to the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution. The focus of this part is twofold.
First, it explores the context within which higher lawmaking occurs.
Both Revolutionaries and Founders sought higher lawmaking
authority from the People only during crises that could not be
resolved except through constitutional change. 17 Second, Part I places
public citizens within that context to discern what the Founders
expected of themselves as "Spokespersons of the People." 8  It
examines separately the Revolution and Independence, 9 the Critical
Period," and the early Founding2' in order to show how the Founders'
views of the people changed due to their experiences under the early
governments. Yet the way the Revolutionaries and Founders
14. This Note generally adopts terminology used by Professor Flaherty. "Thus,
'Revolution' refers to the late eighteenth-century American struggle, both rhetorical
and armed, against British claims of authority over the colonies; 'Independence'
refers to the successful American assertion of autonomy from Great Britain; 'Critical
Period,' refers to the era between Independence and the framing of the Constitution."
Flaherty, supra note 7, at 527 n.17. This Note diverges from Flaherty in referring, at
least initially, to the "Founding" as the period from the drafting of the Constitution in
1787 up to 1800, rather than the period up to the "drafting and ratification of the
Federal Constitution." Id.; see 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 70-73 (discussing the
Jeffersonian "Revolution of 1800" and how it "marked the beginning of a very
different constitutional dynamic"); see also infra notes 300, 325, 333, 338, 369
(discussing 1796 as the end point of the Founding). This Note adopts Professor
Flaherty's use of "Framers" to refer "only to the fifty-five men who participated in
the Philadelphia Convention." See Flaherty, supra note 7, at 527 n.17. In this Note,
"Revolutionaries" refers to those taking part in the Revolution, "Founders" refers to
all those taking part in the Founding and "Ratifiers" refers only to those taking part
in the state ratifying conventions. Both Ratifiers and Framers are included as
Founders. "Federalists" refers to the supporters of the Constitution, not to the
Federalist Party, or "High Federalists," of the 1790s.
15. Joseph M. Lynch, Negotiating the Constitution: The Earliest Debates over
Original Intent 6-7 (1999); Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in
the Making of the Constitution 15-17 (First Vintage Books ed. 1997).
16. William E. Forbath, Constitutional Change and the Politics of History, 108
Yale L.J. 1917, 1923-24 (1999); Jennifer Nedelsky, The Puzzle and Demands of
Modern Constitutionalism, 104 Ethics 500, 503-04 (1994).
17. See infra notes 27-52, 99-124 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 72-92, 138-98 and accompanying text.
19. For further discussion of the Revolution, see infra Part I.A.
20. See infra Part I.B.
21. See infra Part I.C.
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approached constitutional change remained generally the same, even
as their experiences with ordinary lawmaking forced them to make
drastic changes in the form of the national government, and its
relationship to the state governments. Part I demonstrates that the
Founders self-consciously believed that consistency, deliberation, and
consensus were requirements for legitimizing their claim to act on the
higher-lawmaking tier.
Part II places the history in the context of two related contemporary
debates-the use of original intent and the possibility of constitutional
change outside of the Article V amendment process. In particular, it
analyzes Professor Ackerman's "dualist democracy," and some of the
criticisms of it. Ackerman places popular movements at the forefront
of constitutional change." Yet, as his critics point out, the historical
record he uses to support his theory is replete with references to the
statements of politicians and political actors.' Absent are the voices
of ordinary citizens Ackerman depends on in constitutional politics.
Part II also points out that, contrary to Ackerman's broad view of
popular sovereignty, the Founders expected the People to speak
through a "natural" aristocracy, a political elite arising through merit,
that would act for the public good.
Part IIl seeks to extract from the historical narrative the Founders'
view of the role public citizens play both as "Spokespersons of the
People" during periods of higher lawmaking, and as ordinary
politicians during periods of ordinary lawmaking. It proposes a
public-citizen model of higher lawmaking based on the criteria the
Founders espoused to legitimate public citizens' claims to speak for
the People. To be a "Spokesperson of the People" a public citizen
must respond to a crisis that implicates the ability of government to
fulfill constitutionally its necessary function. He or she must argue
consistently in favor of a proposal for constitutional reform, and that
reform must be for the purpose of resolving the crisis rather than for
some ulterior motive. Finally, the public citizen must achieve a
consensus in favor of the reform.
The public-citizen model collapses the issues of original intent and
amendment outside of Article V into one theoretical framework.
Whether one subscribes to the possibility of constitutional
transformation outside of Article V, if a public citizen's writings or
speeches are to be taken as authoritative expressions of constitutional
law or original intent, that public citizen must meet the criteria that
place him or her on the higher-lawmaking tier. Otherwise, the public
citizen is operating on the lower tier of ordinary lawmaking, including
both commendable and corrupt versions of "politics as usual."
Arguments made on this lower tier should not be controlling, but
22. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 266.
23. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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could be used as persuasive examples of customary practice.24 Lastly,
Part III argues that the Founders sought to incorporate these criteria
in Article V.
I. THE ROAD TO PHILADELPHIA: 1763 - 1787
Americans experienced two crises of constitutional proportions
during this twenty-five year period. The first culminated in the birth
of the United States of America in 1776.25 The second was a reaction
to the experiences of the nation's infancy, which led to the adoption of
the United States Constitution.26 The response to both crises was
remarkably similar: a patriotic call for fundamental change for the
public good, national deliberation on the form of such change, and a
requirement for, if not unanimity, a substantial consensus, or
supermajority, before action was taken. This consistency suggests the
basic elements the Founders viewed as prerequisites for constitutional
change.
A. The English Constitution and the Call for Independence:
1763-1776
The Revolution was no mere overreaction to high taxes, but a
considered response to repeated and increasing infringements of the
colonists' rights as Englishmen. Americans viewed the actions of the
British during the 1760s and early 1770s as upsetting the balance
between power and liberty.27 By the time of the Stamp Act Crisis of
1765,1 Americans realized that the English constitution, as it applied
24. For a discussion of custom in constitutional interpretation, see Larry Kramer,
What's A Constitution For Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the
New Deal, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 885, 912-30 (1996) [hereinafter Kramer, What's A
Constitution For Anyway?]. Professor Kramer critiques Ackerman's dualist
democracy theory, noting that "a theory that leaves no other option [other than
amendment] because it ignores the full progression and maturation of governmental
institutions leaves much to be desired." Id. at 930. Professor Kramer's basic point on
custom is "that history is essential to constitutional theory because our
understandings, our values, and the actual structure of our government are constantly,
inevitably, changing." Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-And Through It, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1627 (1997). For an instructive judicial use of custom, see
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597-614, apps. I, 11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing past examples of presidential seizures).
25. See infra Part I.A.
26. See infra Parts I.B-C.
27. For general background, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the
American Revolution 94-104 (enlarged ed. 1992).
28. The Stamp Act imposed the first tax, other than customs duties, on the
American colonies, and taxed almost all paper, from legal documents to liquor
licenses to playing cards. See Morison, supra note 3, at 185. Riotous opposition to the
Act occurred across the British Empire, and particularly in the American colonies. Id.
at 186-87. The colonists viewed it as a serious infringement on their right to govern
the internal affairs of the colonies. Id. at 187. The Act instigated the first continent-
wide meeting, the Stamp Act Congress, to orchestrate opposition to British policy. Id.
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to the colonies, was failing. 9 The failure came first in the House of
Commons. As the democratic element of the English system, the
authority of the Commons was derived from the people Americans
argued that they were not represented in Parliament, because they did
not send a representative of their own choosing.' Despite this,
Parliament continued to exercise its authority as the "Supreme
unlimited power of the Nation."' 2
In English mixed government, King, Lords, and Commons
represented each stratum of society: royalty, nobility, and
commoners.3 3 If any part of the system attempted to gain additional
power, it would be in the interest of the others to resist. The tripartite
design allowed the English system to correct for the periodic loss of
"public virtue,"' and demonstrates that the English recognized that
avarice, party- or self-interest, and expediency-rather than the public
good-would control the operation of government. " Past struggles
for power had resulted in the royal grant of certain liberties to the
nobility and particularly to the commoners, which were expressed in
Magna Charta and the English Bill of Rights.' If King, Lords, or
Commons crossed the boundaries of the inalienable rights and
privileges of each societal stratum, alarms would sound, and the
people could legitimately rise in opposition.'
As late as 1775, Americans viewed the English constitution as the
proper balance of power and liberty- It was to John Adams "the
most perfect combination of human powers in society which finite
wisdom has yet contrived and reduced to practice for the preservation
of liberty and the production of happiness. ' 39 As the decade wore on,
29. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, at
17, 35-37 (1969).
30. Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in
England and America 239-40 (1988). This was particularly true in the field of
taxation. The tax was considered a gift from the people to the King, who would
request funds from Parliament. Id. Taxation was not considered a legislative act, but
a separate power attributed to the "representativeness" of Parliament. Id. As such, a
gift of property could only be given with the consent of the property owner, or his
representative. Id Since Americans were not represented, Parliament could not raise
taxes in the American colonies. Id. "[I]t was evident that the right of the members of
Parliament acquired by their election in England to pass laws binding upon their
electors, does not at the same time give them a right to represent and lay on taxes on
those who never invested them with any such power...." Wood, supra note 29, at
182 (internal quotations omitted).
31. Morgan, supra note 30, at 239-40.
32. Id. at 242.
33. Bailyn, supra note 27, at 70-73; see also Wood, supra note 29, at 18.
34. Public virtue is defined as the sublimation of private interest for the public
good. Wood, supra note 29, at 53.
35. Id at 18-36.
36. Bailyn, supra note 27, at 81.
37. See id at 70; Morgan, supra note 30, at 105-06; Wood, supra note 29, at 23-24.
38. Bailyn, supra note 27, at 67; Wood, supra note 29, at 44-45.
39. Bailyn, supra note 27, at 67 (quoting John Adams).
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he would come to view British practice differently. Americans argued
emphatically that Parliament's jurisdiction did not extend to the
colonies.4" Rather, the colonial assemblies had power equal to
Parliament in all areas relating to the colonies except trade.41 The
King was the colonies' link to Great Britain, whereas the Commons
only had power over the people it represented. 2 If, as the colonists
believed, they were not constituents of any Member of Parliament,
then Parliament could gain no power over them constitutionally,
except through the King.43
From this leap of logic followed the second failure of the English
constitution. If Parliament did not have authority over the colonies,
then the King was unconstitutionally acquiescing in these acts at best,
and imposing them himself through a corrupted and subservient
Parliament at worst.' Despite the denunciation by the colonists of
Parliament's power to legislate for them, the oppressive Acts of
Parliament continued. Even the repeal of the Stamp Act, an apparent
victory for the American position, carried with it the declaration that
Parliament retained the power to legislate for the colonies in all
cases.4 The Quartering Act of 1765 was followed by the forced
suspension of the New York Assembly.46 With the Stamp Act,
Quartering Act, and Tea Act,4 7 the imposition of military rule in
Massachusetts, 48 and the closing of Boston Harbor,49 it was clear to the
40. See Morgan, supra note 30, at 243; Morison, supra note 3, at 187.
41. Morgan, supra note 30, at 243-44. The concession on trade was seen as
necessary to permit uniform regulation within the Empire. Wood, supra note 29, at
349. Even this concession was eventually repudiated. Morgan, supra note 30, at 243.
4Z See John Adams, Novanglus VII (Mar. 6, 1775), reprinted in 2 Papers of John
Adams 307, 313-15 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1977) [hereinafter The Adams Papers];
Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America (July 1774),
reprinted in 1 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 129 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950)
[hereinafter The Jefferson Papers].
43. Morgan, supra note 30, at 243.
44. See Wood, supra note 29, at 39-43 (describing American suspicion of
conspiracy between King and Parliament).
45. Charles A. Beard & Mary R. Beard, A Basic History of the United States 98-
103 (1944).
46. The Quartering Act required colonists to house British soldiers in their
homes. The New York Assembly was suspended for refusing to enforce the Act. Id.
at 99-100.
47. The Tea Act of 1773 "removed the duty on tea entering England" without
repealing the tax on tea entering the American colonies, which allowed the East India
Company to undercut prices even on smuggled tea. Morison, supra note 3, at 203.
Americans protested the monopoly thus granted to the East India Company; the
protests culminated in the Boston Tea Party, when protesters disguised as Indians
pitched the tea into Boston Harbor. Id. at 203-04. The Boston Tea Party angered
King George III to the point that Parliament passed the Coercive Acts-legislation
designed to bring Massachusetts in particular, and British America generally, to heel.
Id. at 204-05.
48. The Government and Administration of Justice Acts, part of the Coercive
Acts, made nearly all colonial officials subject to royal dismissal, and prohibited
committees of correspondence and town hall meetings. Id. at 205-06. Simultaneously,
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Revolutionaries in 1776 that King George HI preferred to endorse
Parliament's power rather than protect American liberty. As Gordon
Wood noted, "[w]hatever the actual responsibility of royal authority
for the dissatisfactions and frustrations in American society, by 1776
the English Crown had come to bear the full load."u With pleas to
the Crown going unanswered, particularly the Olive Branch Petition
of 1775,1 the Revolutionaries perceived independence from Great
Britain as the only way to restore their rights as Englishmen. 2 The
American theory of English constitutionalism rejected the British
practice of English constitutionalism.
Influencing the American reaction were the teachings of both
classical philosophers and Enlightenment scholars-the core of the
English Whig tradition.53 The Revolutionary generation drew from
ancient history and philosophy an understanding of the trials and
tribulations of the first republics, noting in particular the rise and fall
of the Roman Republic. In the Roman histories, they saw an ideal
beginning, "full of virtue: simplicity, patriotism, integrity, a love of
justice and of liberty."' What defeated the Romans was the decay of
the moral and political fabric of their society wrought by a love of
luxury. 6 The lesson of antiquity, as Wood summarized, was that "the
love of refinement, the desire for distinction and elegance eventually
weakened a people and left them soft and effeminate, dissipated
cowards, unfit and undesiring to serve the state."" For a republic to
survive, public virtue was a prerequisite.s
If antiquity illuminated how public virtue could control the dangers
of power and secure the rights of liberty, the Enlightenment writers
searched for a formula to balance them in virtue's absence.5 9 These
General Thomas Gage was appointed governor and captain-general of Massachusetts,
with a naval squadron and two regiments of British soldiers to enforce the new laws.
Id at 206. These actions led to the formation of the Continental Congress and the
beginnings of organized resistance. Id. at 206-07.
49. The Boston Port Act, one of the Coercive Acts, "virtually blockaded Boston
until it chose to pay" for the tea lost in the Boston Tea Party. Id. at 205.
50. Wood, supra note 29, at 82.
51. This was a final attempt at reconciliation that frustrated more impatient
Revolutionaries with its gentle tone. See The Spirit of 'Seventy-Six: The Story of the
American Revolution As Told By Participants 277-80 (Henry Steele Commager &
Richard B. Morris eds., Da Capo Press 1995).
52. See Wood, supra note 29, at 41-45.
53. Id. at 6-8. Whiggism was a political theory which emphasized popular consent
to government as the source of governmental power, the inclusion of popular will in
government as a balance to royal prerogative, and the dangers of imbalance in
government leading to tyranny or licentiousness. Id. at 18.
54. Bailyn, supra note 27, at 23-26.
55. Id. at 25.
56. Wood, supra note 29, at 35-36.
57. Id. at 52.
58. Id at 68.
59. Bailyn, supra note 27, at 27; Wood, supra note 29, at 6-7, 40-41.
2209
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
more contemporary lessons were used by eighteenth-century
American writers on both sides of the issue of independence. 0
In pamphlet after pamphlet the American writers cited Locke on
natural rights and on the social and governmental contract,
Montesquieu and later Delolme on the character of British liberty
and on the institutional requirements for its attainment, Voltaire on
the evils of clerical oppression, Beccaria on the reform of criminal
law, Grotius, Puffendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel on the laws of
nature and of nations, and on the principles of civil government. 61
Power, according to these writers, was necessary to control the vices
of individuals to better secure the liberty of the community as a
whole.62 Restrictions on individual liberty were not contrary to
republicanism, however, since the goal of the republic "was public or
political liberty."'63 The development of the English constitution was a
direct, if gradual, result of the struggle to secure English liberty
against repeated exertions of power in the absence of public virtue.64
This security was achieved, however, by pitting the three social classes
of British society against each other within the constitutional
framework.65 An American Republic could not benefit from this
system since one of the guiding principles of republicanism was the
eradication of artificial social distinctions. 66
Fortunately for America, the experiences of 1774-1776 appeared to
demonstrate that Americans were imbued with a degree of public
virtue, of patriotism and public spiritedness, sufficient to support a
republican form of government. As John Page wrote to Jefferson:
I think our Countrymen have exhibited an uncommon Degree of
Virtue, not only in submiting [sic] to all the hard Restrictions and
exposing themselves to all the Dangers which are the Consequence
of the Disputes they are involved in with Great Britain, but in
60. Citations to English Whig writers were as common in the writings of
American Tories (Americans who remained loyal to Britain) as in those of American
Whigs (Americans arguing against British policy and eventually in favor of
independence). Bailyn, supra note 27, at 28-29.
61. Id. at 27.
62. See, e.g., John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End
of Civil Government (1690), reprinted in Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter
Concerning Toleration 3, 56 (Charles L. Sherman ed., 1937) (arguing that people
must give up the liberty to do as they choose in order to preserve society);
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 44 (Anne M. Cohler et al. trans. & eds., 1989)
("[Ilt is a very true maxim that if one is to love equality and frugality in a republic,
these must have been established by the laws.").
63. Wood, supra note 29, at 61.
64. Bailyn, supra note 27, at 79-84 (discussing origins of English constitution in
Saxon England and tracing development through Glorious Revolution in 1688);
Wood, supra note 29, at 260-67 (describing genesis of American preference for
written constitutions).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
66. Wood, supra note 29, at 70-73.
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behaving so peaceably and honestly as they have when they were
free from the Restraint of Laws.
67
The colonists even obeyed the import prohibitions on British goods
that the Continental Congress had established, despite the inability of
the provincial assemblies or the Continental Congress to enforce
them. 68 While this may not have been surprising in New England,
where the British military presence was initially felt, it is significant
that American merchants in other major ports-Philadelphia,
Baltimore, and Charleston-did not take advantage of the Boston
merchants' distress.69 The Revolution confirmed the Enlightenment
vision of America as an energetic, industrious, self-sacrificing nation."
For Adams, if a successful republic could be established, it would
happen in America, for "public Virtue is the only Foundation of
Republics," and "[o]ur dear Americans perhaps have as much of it as
any Nation now existing. 71
Early state constitutions emphasized the special character of the
American people. The greatest concern at the time was preventing
the rise of tyrants. 2 Therefore, power largely was placed in the state
legislatures.73  To ensure that these assemblies accurately and
steadfastly would reflect the will of the people, popular elections were
67. Letter from John Page to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 26, 1776), in 1 The Jefferson
Papers, supra note 42, at 288; see also Wood, supra note 29, at 102.
Even the Reverend John Witherspoon, who disagreed violently with Paine's
optimistic view of human nature and set out in a 1776 sermon to expose the
passions and depravity of all men, could not refrain from marveling that "so
great a degree of public spirit... has prevailed among all ranks of men."
Id at 103.
68. Wood, supra note 29, at 102.
69. In fact, other colonies "vied in sending food and money for the relief of the
blockaded town." Morison, supra note 3, at 206.
70. Wood, supra note 29, at 98-103.
71. Letter from John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren (Apr. 16, 1776), in 4 The
Adams Papers, supra note 42, at 123, 124. Adams continued:
But I have seen all along my Life, Such Selfishness, and Littleness even in
New England, that I sometimes tremble to think that, altho We are engaged
in the best Cause that ever employed the Human Heart, yet the Prospect of
success is doubtfull [sic] not for Want of Power or of Wisdom, but of Virtue.
Id. at 124-25. In this view, as in many others, Adams was ahead of his
contemporaries. Cf Joseph J. Ellis, Passionate Sage: The Character and Legacy of
John Adams 40 (paperback ed. 1993) ("Adams came to seem more and more like the
radical prophet whose predictions kept coming true."); Wood, supra note 29, at 568
("[Adams] came to see, with more speed and insight than most, the mistaken
assumptions about their character on which the Americans of 1776 had rested their
Revolution.").
72. Wood, supra note 29, at 134-36.
73. "The Revolutionary [state] constitution-makers released and institutionalized
what had previously been varied and often confused and thwarted attempts by the
[colonial] legislatures to assume magisterial responsibilities...." Id. at 155. To
Americans in 1776, the state legislatures "represented more than the supreme
lawmaking authority in their new states. They were as well the heirs to most of the
prerogative powers taken away from the governors by the Revolution." Id. at 162-63.
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held regularly.74 For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution called
for annual elections.' Since tyranny was only to be feared from the
executive, or perhaps an executive council, this design satisfied even
radical republican leaders.76  Although some Revolutionaries
recognized the inevitability of factions,' the greater virtue of
American society was relied upon to avoid anarchy. The prevailing
view assumed that factional politics would be kept outside the
institutions of government.78 Even as pessimistic a student of human
nature as John Adams79 "indignantly pointed out, the idea of the
public liberty's being tyrannical was illogical: 'a democratical
despotism is a contradiction in terms."'8 ° Thus, not only could the
people be relied upon to place the good of the community over their
own personal interest, but also their elected representative would, as
Adams put it to James Warren, "know no good, separate from that of
his subjects." 81
The deliberative process begun in the 1760s drew the colonists
slowly, but inexorably, towards independence. Americans, many of
whom had emigrated from England to escape civil or ecclesiastical
tyranny, were ever vigilant for encroachments on their liberties and
rights." As John Dickinson wrote in 1768, the question was "not,
what evil has actually attended particular measures-but, what evil, in
the nature of things, is likely to attend them."'83 In 1775, Edmund
Burke echoed this sentiment, noting "that the colonists' intensive
study of law and politics had made them acutely inquisitive and
sensitive about their liberties.... Americans... were anticipating
their grievances and resorting to principles even before they actually
74. Id. at 165-66.
75. Pa. Const. of 1776, § 9, reprinted in 8 Sources and Documents of United States
Constitutions 277,280 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979).
76. For example, Benjamin Franklin, who presided over the assembly which
created it, was quite pleased with the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776. Clinton
Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention 87 (Mentor Books 1968) (1966).
77. Wood, supra note 29, at 59. Madison provides the classic definition of faction:
"[A] number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole,
who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of
the community." The Federalist No. 10, at 46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
78. Wood, supra note 29, at 59.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 103-04.
80. Wood, supra note 29, at 62-63 (quoting John Adams).
81. Id. at 67-68.
82. See Bailyn, supra note 27, at 83; see also Thomas Paine, Common Sense
(1776), reprinted in Thomas Paine Reader 65, 81 (Michael Foot & Isaac Kramnick
eds., 1987) ("This new world hath been the asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil
and religious liberty from every part of Europe." (emphasis omitted)).
83. Wood, supra note 29, at 5 (emphasis in original) (quoting John Dickinson,
Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies
(1768)).
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suffered."" The foresight of the revolutionary leaders was perhaps
responsible for the successful drive towards independence, for each
new British policy reinforced the tyrannical view of King and
Parliament previously argued in pamphlet, newspaper, and speech by
the Revolutionaries.s The increasing popular opposition to British
policy, in part a response to the protests of colonial leaders, led to the
Stamp Act Congress in 17 65, the First Continental Congress in 1774,
the Second Continental Congress in 1775,1 and finally to the
widespread support for independence in 17 76 .1
The ongoing dynamic between local discussion and continental
deliberation was designed not only to win over more hesitant
members of educated society, but also to inform and convince the
general populace-those who would have to take up arms against
Britain.89  The decision-making process on the question of
independence was not exercised merely in private letters and diaries,
or exclusively in secret meetings of the intellectual and political elite.
It took place in pamphlets and newspapers, public speeches and
sermons, in town halls and taverns ° It was a question, a crisis, which
captured the mind of the farmer as well as the statesman. As John
Adams argued under the pseudonym "Novanglus," no popular leader
could "persuade a large people, for any length of time together, to
think themselves wronged, injured, and oppressed, unless they really
were, and saw and felt it to be so."" Only through this searching
inquiry did the colonists overcome their customary deference towards
England.9 The American opposition to British policy was a populist
movement as much as it was an imperial struggle between thirteen
colonial legislatures, and Parliament and the King.
84. Wood, supra note 29, at 4-5.
85. Cf. id at 4 ("It was, said Edmund Randolph, a revolution without an
immediate oppression, without a cause depending so much on hasty feeling as
theoretic reasoning." (internal quotations omitted)).
86. See supra note 28.
87. See supra note 3.
88. See generally 1 Pamphlets of the American Revolution: 1750-1776 (Bernard
Bailyn ed., 1965) (describing major pamphlets of the period and their place in the
drive towards independence).
89. "The communication of understanding... lay at the heart of the
Revolutionary movement, and its great expressions, embodied in the best of the
pamphlets, are consequently expository and explanatory: didactic, systematic, and
direct, rather than imaginative and metaphoric." Bailyn, supra note 27, at 19.
90. See id. at 19-21 ("The treatises, the sermons, the speeches, the exchanges of
letters published as pamphlets-even some of the most personal polemics-all
contain elements of this great, transforming debate.").
91. Wood, supra note 29, at 39 (quoting John Adams). In public writings, it was
common practice to use pseudonyms to avoid reliance on personal reputation. See
Rakove, supra note 15, at 136-37. Use of names from classical antiquity, such as
"Novanglus" and "Publius" were particularly popular with American eighteenth-
century writers. Wood, supra note 29, at 49.
92. Wood, supra note 29, at 38.
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If in 1776 the Revolutionaries were anxious about the prospect of
war with the greatest military power of the time, they were confident
in their ability to establish governments on the republican ideal made
impossible in Europe by corruption and hereditary (and thus
arbitrary)93 distinction.94  Revolutionary leaders enjoyed broad
popular support, including the support of a volunteer army (whose
numbers admittedly ebbed and flowed throughout the war,
particularly towards the end of 1776). 95 Significantly, the support for
independence came from every former colony-the Continental
Congress had adopted the Declaration of Independence, and thus a
final break with Great Britain, unanimously. 6 It was no accident that
the most widely-read work of the period was a compelling and
straightforward plea in favor of American independence called
Common Sense.' The Revolutionaries recognized that independence
would have been impossible without a popular consensus that
included every colony.9"
B. Frailties of Confederacy: The Critical Period from 1776- 1787
While the war raged across New Jersey, and up through the South,
the Revolutionaries were also establishing state governments and
deciding upon a plan of union.99 The early state constitutions followed
a similar pattern of strictly limiting the power of the chief magistrate,
or eliminating a magistrate altogether. 100 Even where checks and
balances on power were instituted, as in the Virginia Constitution of
93. See id. at 78-79 (discussing Whig loathing of political patronage); see also
Morgan, supra note 30, at 249 (quoting Benjamin Rush as believing there were
"natural distinctions of rank in Pennsylvania, as certain.., as the artificial distinctions
of men in Europe").
94. See Wood, supra note 29, at 127-29.
95. See Morison, supra note 3, at 228.
96. Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress 187 (W.W. Norton & Co.
ed. 1964) (1941). New York originally abstained, but subsequently joined in the
Declaration on July 15, 1776. Id. at 187, 190-91. Though John Dickinson absented
himself from Congress rather than sign the Declaration, he still supported his country
in the Continental Army and later returned to Congress. Id. at 193; Rossiter, supra
note 76, at 94.
97. Paine, supra note 82. An estimated 100,000 copies were sold in 1776 alone.
Michael Foot & Isaac Kramnick, Editor's Introduction to Thomas Paine Reader,
supra note 82, at 10. It was immediately translated into French, and became an
instant success in Paris. Id.
98. See Burnett, supra note 96, at 150, 174-75.
99. See Morison, supra note 3, at 241-45, 257-61 (describing the military campaign
in New Jersey from 1776-1780 and the campaign in the South from 1779-1781);
Rossiter, supra note 76, at 40 (noting Articles of Confederation proposed in 1777 and
finally ratified in 1781); Wood, supra note 29, at 132-33 (discussing formation of state
constitutions from 1776-1778).
100. Wood, supra note 29, at 135-37. Massachusetts, initially operating under its
revived Charter of 1691, did not have a governor, though it was understood at the
time that the government under the Charter was temporary until a constitution could
be drafted and approved. Id. at 133.
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1776, the legislature controlled the governmental agenda.'," Thomas
Jefferson, who helped draft Virginia's constitution, later conceded
that in operation the state's legislators had exceeded the bounds of
ordered liberty, and called for a convention to remedy its defects."'
Revolutionary leaders across the continent shared Jefferson's
concerns. To quote John Adams:
The Spirit of Commerce... is much to be feared is [sic]
incompatible with that purity of Heart, and Greatness of soul which
is necessary for an happy Republic. This Same Spirit of Commerce
is as rampant in New England as in any Part of the World.... While
this is the Case, there is great Danger that a Republican
Government, would be very factious and turbulent there103
Adams feared "that in every assembly, Members will obtain an
Influence, by Noise not sense. By Meanness, not Greatness. By
Ignorance not Learning."4
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, whose principal architect
was John Adams, 5 attempted to address the problems which arose
under other states' constitutions. Separation of powers was expressly
introduced in the Massachusetts Constitution,"° including tenure and
fixed salaries for judges." The executive was strengthened and also
given a fixed salary to encourage independence from the legislature.'
Additionally, the legislature was bicameral, with heightened property
ownership requirements for entry to the upper house.109 These
101. See id. at 150-56 (discussing Virginia Constitution and American fears of
powerful magistrates in the development of separation of powers).
102. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (1787), reprinted in
Thomas Jefferson: Writings 123, 235-55 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). -Ordered
liberty" referred to the Whig principle that power and liberty must be balanced for
society to prosper. See supra notes 27-39, 53-66 and accompanying text.
103. 4 The Adams Papers, supra note 42, at 125.
104. Letter from John Adams to James Warren (Apr. 22, 1776), in id. at 135, 137.
105. Wood, supra note 29, at 568. Adams' pamphlet Thoughts on Government was
"the most influential work guiding the framers of the new republics." Id.
106. Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. I, art. XXX, reprinted in 5 Sources and Documents of
United States Constitutions, supra note 75, at 92, 96.
[T]he legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial
powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative
and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a
government of laws, and not of men.
Id
107. Tenure was for the time stated in the judicial commission, but could not
extend beyond seven years. Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. II, ch. III, arts. I, Ill, reprinted in
id. at 104-05.
108. Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § 1, art. XIII, reprinted in id. at 103.
109. Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. II, ch. I, § 1, art. I, reprinted in id. at 96 (establishing
bicameral legislature); Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. II, ch. I, § 2, art. V, reprinted in id. at
99 (stating property requirements). Only the richest property owners were qualified
for the governorship. Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § 1, art. II, reprinted in id. at
100 (requiring ownership of a freehold valued at one thousand pounds to qualify).
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improvements over earlier constitutions sought to control the factions
that had erupted in the lower house, while adding the erudition and
experience of the "upper class" to the legislative process."t0 Though
the Massachusetts Constitution was deemed the best of the state
governmental frameworks, it did not prevent anarchy. Shays'
Rebellion in 1787, sparked by heavy taxes and burdensome debt, was
a popular uprising in western Massachusetts that "escalated from a
concerted effort to close county courts into a military confrontation"
between armed farmers and state militia."' While the uprising was
put down with little violence, it was a clear signal that the political
status quo was dangerously unstable.112 Professor Rakove questioned,
as the Revolutionaries must have, "If stable and seemingly well-
governed Massachusetts could erupt in popular upheaval, what other
state could claim to be more secure? 11 3
Economic instability, scarcity of hard currency and the growing
profusion of paper money, closed trade routes (largely due to the
British), and high taxes forced upon citizens by even higher debt all
contributed to an increase in state action based primarily on the self-
interest of a controlling faction.114 As Clinton Rossiter neatly
summarized:
By the middle of the 1780's the unrest in every state had impelled all
but the steadiest men in power to act impetuously, all but the
luckiest to make mistakes, all but the bravest to turn their backs on
hard problems that clamored for attention. Despite official
protestations of enduring devotion to the doctrine of the separation
of powers, the governments of most states were in the hands of self-
willed legislatures. Despite the energetic efforts of the gentry and its
political allies, the control of most legislatures fell at one time or
another into the hands of a small-farmer class that was chiefly
interested in paying off old scores and new debts as speedily as
possible."5
James Madison, in his "Vices of the Political System of the United
States," charged the state governments with seven of his eleven
vices." 6 The states were guilty of failing to comply with requisitions of
Congress for funding, of violating the Treaty of Paris, of
discriminating against the trade of other states, of abridging the liberty
110. See Morgan, supra note 30, at 249-51 (analyzing American attempts to equate
wealth with natural merit).
111. Rakove, supra note 15, at 33.
112. See Rossiter, supra note 76, at 48-49.
113. Rakove, supra note 15, at 34.
114. Wood, supra note 29, at 403-13.
115. Rossiter, supra note 76, at 39-40. Apparently, where the small-farmer class
was unable to gain control of the legislature, they resorted to more direct methods of
reform, such as Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts. See supra text accompanying notes
111-13.
116. Rossiter, supra note 76, at 40.
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and property rights of their citizens, of encroaching upon the authority
of Congress, and of generally failing to support the Union made
"perpetual" by the Articles of Confederation." 7  John Adams
seemingly was correct-Americans did in fact have as much virtue as
citizens of any nation then existing, 18 which was to say, not much at
all. Unless a crisis, such as the British crisis in 1774-1776, convinced
them to set aside their interests in support of a common cause, self-
interest crept into the operation of these early governments.', 9
Democratic despotism, even if it was illogical, as Adams had argued,""
was not only possible, but was in fact thriving in the uncertainties of
the 1780s. 11
The national scene under the Articles of Confederation was no
better, and perhaps even worse. The principal failures of the Articles
were the inability of the Confederation Congress to generate revenue
without the assistance of the states, and Congress' powerlessness in
foreign affairs to enforce treaty obligations or pay war debts owed to
foreign creditors."z Failure to abide by the obligations of the Treaty
of Paris allowed the British an excuse for retaining their Northwestern
forts, a serious impediment to western expansion.'2 It was not simply
the problems facing the Confederation that instigated the political
crisis of the mid-1780s, but rather the inability of Congress
constitutionally to do anything to resolve them.24
Initial attempts at reform were unsuccessful. As early as 1781,
amendments to the Articles were proposed, but it soon became clear
that Rhode Island, if no other state was willing, would block any
117. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 9 The
Papers of James Madison 345, 348-57 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975)
[hereinafter The Madison Papers]. Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation
states that the "union shall be perpetual." Articles of Confederation art. XIII,
reprinted in Rossiter, supra note 76, at 307.
11& See supra text accompanying note 71.
119. Cf Wood, supra note 29, at 423-29 (discussing change in American perception
of themselves as a virtuous people and the need to compensate for this deficiency).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
121. "The economic and social instability engendered by the Revolution was
finding political expression in the state legislatures at the very time they were larger,
more representative, and more powerful than ever before in American history."
Wood, supra note 29, at 405.
Americans thus experienced in the 1780's not merely a crisis of authority-
licentiousness leading to anarchy-which was a comprehensible abuse of
republican liberty, but also a serious shattering of older ways of examining
politics and a fundamental questioning of majority rule that threatened to
shake the foundations of their republican experiments.
Id. at 411.
122. Rakove supra note 15, at 24-28; Rossiter, supra note 76, at 37-39.
123. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations
of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich. L Rev. 1075, 1115-16
(2000).
124. Rakove, supra note 15, at 27.
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attempted reform.125 By 1784, these problems, and the failed attempts
to resolve them, generated enough concern that political leaders from
several states, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and
John Dickinson, met in Annapolis to develop a plan of action. 2 6 The
Annapolis Convention called on the Confederation Congress to
appoint "commissioners to take into consideration the situation of the
United States; to devise such further provisions as shall appear to
them necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government
adequate to the exigencies of the Union." '127
Though concern for the continued vitality of the new nation was
growing in all parts of the country, many doubted that the situation
was truly as bad as the prognosticators were suggesting.128 A letter in
the South Carolina Gazette and Public Advertiser challenged the
notion of a growing crisis:
In reality ... though there never was a period in which calamity was
so much talked of, I do not believe there ever was a period in which
it was so little experienced by the people of this State. If we are
undone, we are the most splendidly ruined of any nation in the
universe.129
Many Americans experienced a period of prosperity in trade and
business during the 1780s, and were unaffected by any social
upheaval. 130 Even some who were affected considered the next
elections as a reasonable remedy.131  However, even if the social,
financial, and political problems of the late-1770s and 1780s were not
a crisis calling for a national, constitutional remedy, Washington,
Madison, Hamilton, and other leading nationalists refused to view
safeguarding the new nation as a purely reactionary process. 32 Many,
if not most, of the Federalist leaders (or those who would soon
become known as Federalist leaders) were those who in the 1760s and
early 1770s protested infringements of their rights before they actually
125. Id. at 25.
126. Id. at 32-33.
127. The Federalist No. 40, at 215 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting report of the Annapolis Convention).
128. Wood, supra note 29, at 395. Some historians accepted this view of the
Critical Period, considering the Federalist movement to be in the nature of a
conspiracy of the propertied elite. See Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation
of the Constitution of the United States 47-49 (paperback ed. 1961); John P. Roche,
The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 799, 801
(1961), reprinted in The Formation and Ratification of the Constitution: Major
Historical Interpretations 490,492 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987) (arguing that convincing
state ratifying convention delegates that "change was imperative" was the "great
achievement" of the Federalists).
129. Wood, supra note 29, at 395 (quoting South Carolina Gazette and Public
Advertiser, May 18-21, 1785).
130. Rossiter, supra note 76, at 45.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 35, 45-46.
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suffered.133 They realized that the nation's short-term problems could
prevent it from achieving its long-term potential."- The call for a
convention to reform the Articles of Confederation was not reached
lightly, or in response to petty problems. 35 According to Clinton
Rossiter:
Two such gatherings had already taken place in their generation-
the Stamp Act Congress in New York in 1765, the Continental
Congress in Philadelphia in 1774-and only a powerful sense of
misgiving could have forced a third in the face of the localism of
many leading politicians, the apathy of most ordinary men, and the
inertia built into this as into most political systems.'36
American political leaders-including John Dickinson and John
Rutledge, who had attended both Congresses-recognized, not out of
"personal ambition or the hope of gain for state or section," that
another "national deliberation" was needed to achieve what they had
envisioned in 1776.137 The Federalist Revolution had begun.
C. Saving America from Itself- The Philadelphia Convention of 1787
Whatever misgivings some political leaders may have had,
Washington caught the mood of most in 1786 when he wrote:
No Mom ever dawned more favourable than ours did-and no day
was ever more clouded than the present! Wisdom, [and] good
examples are necessary at this time to rescue the political machine
from the impending storm.138
The delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, '39 the "patriotic sages
of America,"' met Washington's challenge. Almost every one of the
fifty-five delegates to the Convention was a major figure in his state.'
133. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
134. See Rossiter, supra note 76, at 45-46.
135. See Wood, supra note 29, at 467.
The calling of the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 was the climax of the
process of rethinking that had begun with the reformation of the state
constitutions in the late seventies and early eighties, a final step taken from
the fullest conviction that there was not a better, perhaps no other, which
could be adopted in this crisis of our public affairs.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
136. Rossiter, supra note 76, at 36.
137. Id
138. Letter from George Washington to James Madison (Nov. 5, 1786), in George
Washington: Writings 621, 621 (John Rhodehamel ed., 1997); see also Wood, supra
note 29, at 471 ("All 'men of reflection,' even 'the most orthodox republicans,' said
Madison, were alarmed by 'the existing embarrassments and mortal diseases of the
Confederacy.'").
139. The Philadelphia Convention was a national assembly of representatives from
each state created to propose changes to the Articles of Confederation. See Rossiter,
supra note 76, at 47-48.
140. Supra text accompanying note 1.
141. "Of all the fifty-five Framers-to-be, only Jacob Broom of Delaware seemed
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Many of them, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Robert
Morris, Robert Livingston, Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson,
James Madison, and Charles Pinckney among them, had continental
reputations (or world-wide reputations in the case of Washington and
Franklin). 42 In addition to serving their states in Congress or the state
assemblies, most delegates had served in some capacity in the army or
militia during the Revolution. 43 Eight of them signed the Declaration
of Independence.'" Gordon Wood recorded that "[t]he Federalists
were astonished at the outpouring in 1787 of influential and
respectable people who had earlier remained quiescent."'45 Edward
Carrington wrote to Jefferson, "'Men are brought into action who had
consigned themselves to an eve of rest.""46  The public virtue the
Revolutionaries had displayed in the previous decade in support of
American liberty was rising again in support of American nationalism.
The secrecy rule adopted by the Framers at the opening of the
Convention demonstrated their desire for a serious deliberation on
the interests of the public good. 47 Secrecy allowed the Framers to
debate honestly without fear of misrepresentation in the press. 48 It
enhanced their willingness to question what Rossiter called "such
sacred cows" as state sovereignty and the "glories of the militia.""'
By releasing to the public only their finished work, the Framers were
able to propose undeveloped solutions and radical changes without
totally out of place in a gathering of the 'first characters' of the land." Rossiter, supra
note 76, at 121. Interestingly, he was the only native of Delaware among that state's
delegation. Id. at 96. He had been chosen as a delegate to the Annapolis Convention
but opted not to attend. Id.
142. Id. at 121. John Adams later wrote that history would remember the
American Revolution as being fought solely by Franklin and Washington: "The
essence of the whole will be that Dr. Franklins [sic] electrical Rod, smote the Earth and
out sprung General Washington. That Franklin electrified him with his rod-and
thenceforward these two conducted all the Policy, Negotiations, Legislatures and War."
Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush (Apr. 4, 1790), in Old Family Letters:
Copied from the Originals for Alexander Biddle, Series A, at 55 (Phila., Lippincott
1892); see also Rossiter, supra note 76, at 101.
143. Rossiter, supra note 76, at 123-25.
144. Id. at 67-121, 124.
145. Wood, supra note 29, at 498.
146. Id.
147. The rule required "[t]hat nothing spoken in the House be printed, or
otherwise published, or communicated without leave." 1 The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, at 15 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) (May 29, 1787) [hereinafter
Farrand]. With the exception of a few minor infractions by the North Carolina
delegation and Benjamin Franklin, the Framers strictly adhered to the rule. Rossiter,
supra note 76, at 143, 286. Franklin permitted his final speech in the Convention to be
published. Id. at 286. The North Carolina delegation leaked vague information to the
governor of their state. Id. The Framers did not even break the rule in private letters
to their closest friends and allies. Id.
148. Id. at 142-43.
149. Id. at 143.
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fearing or pandering to "any gallery save that of posterity, one that
usually brings out the best in such men."''
The debate that raged over the summer of 1787 was generally
between those with a truly nationalist position, such as Hamilton,
Madison and Wilson, and those who more generally sought only a
strengthening of the Confederacy, such as Luther Martin, William
Paterson and Roger Sherman.151 The Convention was a meeting of
the leaders of a movement in most states for a stronger national
government. 152 Significantly, those who would become Antifederalists
were left out in the cold. 53 These anti-nationalists would have a
chance to defeat the movement's agenda during the ratification
process for, as James Wilson argued on June 16, the Framers were
merely proposing to the people and were not deciding anything
themselves."s' Through the Convention they were able to work out
their differing views on how the national government should be
strengthened and mold them into a single, unanimous proposal. 5
The consensus thus achieved provided a substantial advantage to the
Federalists over their opposition. 56 However, few of even the leading
Federalists were completely happy with the result."
Nevertheless, Federalists like Wilson, Hamilton, and Madison all
advocated strongly in support of the proposed constitution.1-' s This
150. Id at 142-43.
151. Id at 49, 131-34.
152. See id. at 125.
153. In some cases, this was by choice: Patrick Henry and Richard Henry Lee
declined inclusion in the Virginia delegation, and Governor George Clinton of New
York decided instead to send Robert Yates and John Lansing as loyal proxies. Id. at
80, 108. Examining Clinton's choice of Lansing and Yates as New York delegates,
Clinton Rossiter concluded that they were men "on whom George Clinton could
depend for vigilant obstinacy in behalf of New York's policy of independent anti-
nationalism." Id. at 80. Their loyalty to Clinton was probably the only reason Clinton
allowed Hamilton to be the third member of the delegation. See id.
154. 1 Farrand, supra note 147, at 261-62 (June 16, 1787). John Jay also
characterized the Constitution as a proposal in Federalist No. 2, noting that -this plan
is only recommended, not imposed." The Federalist No. 2, at 7 (John Jay) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison was in agreement as well. Id. No. 40, at 220 (James
Madison).
155. See Rossiter, supra note 76, at 131, 239. Every state delegation voted for the
Constitution, but not every state delegate. 2 Farrand, supra note 147, at 641-49 (Sept.
17,1787).
156. Rossiter, supra note 76, at 239.
157. Franklin stated in a closing speech that there were "several parts of this
constitution which I do not at present approve." 2 Farrand, supra note 147, at 641
(Sept. 17, 1787). Madison complained all summer of certain elements of the Virginia
Plan that were removed in the final draft, particularly the elimination of a council of
revision and a congressional veto on state laws. Rossiter, supra note 76, at 148, 169,
184, 192. For Hamilton, even the Virginia Plan, a far more nationalist document than
the Constitution, was not satisfactory. According to Yates' notes, he described the
Virginia Plan as "pork still, with a little change of the sauce." 1 Farrand, supra note
147, at 301 (June 18, 1787) (emphasis omitted).
158. See, e.g., Charles R. Kesler, Introduction to The Federalist Papers, at xdi-xiii
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devotion to the Federalist proposal demonstrated a particular kind of
public virtue-the sublimation of self-interest and personal opinion to
the consensus of the Federalists as a group-that was critical to the
successful ratification of the Constitution. 59  Knowing that the
compromises agreed to in the Convention were critical to gaining a
consensus in all (or at least the necessary nine) 60 states, the
Federalists argued in favor of the Constitution with a consistency and
energy that the Antifederalists could not match. 6' The Federalist
movement was organized across state lines. 62  Crucially, the
Constitution had broad support among the engaged citizenry of most
states.1 63 Rossiter wrote, "[the Federalists] numbered among their
leaders an overpowering majority of the word-makers-preachers,
teachers, pamphleteers, editors, and lawyers-of republican
America."'" They also had the support of many political leaders,
most notably George Washington. 65 These organizational advantages
gave the Federalists one weapon to use in their push for the
Convention, and then for ratification of the Constitution: the
"effective mobilization of public opinion.1 66
The Federalists utilized this weapon to great effect. Hamilton
began his public argument in support of the Constitution with a plea
that the people's decision "be directed by a judicious estimate of our
true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not
connected with the public good." 67 Though Hamilton was forced to
admit that "this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to
be expected,"'" John Jay hoped that "[e]xperience on a former
occasion" would encourage the people to make "those calm and
mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede the
(1999) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("So similar, then, were [Hamilton's and
Madison's] arguments and writing style in The Federalist that their efforts to disguise
themselves as Publius must be judged an extraordinary success."); James Wilson,
Speech in the State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), in 2 Documentary History, supra note
1, at 167-72.
159. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
160. See U.S. Const. art. VII; see supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
161. See Wood, supra note 29, at 485-86 (describing the disability of the
Antifederalists as a group).
162. A critical organizational tool was, ironically, the Confederation Congress
(thirty-nine of the fifty-five delegates to the Convention were, or had been, members
of Congress). Roche, supra note 128, at 492. "[M]embership in the Congress under
the Articles of Confederation worked to establish a continental frame of reference,
that a Congressman from Pennsylvania and one from South Carolina would share a
universe of discourse which provided them with a conceptual common denominator
vis d vis their respective state legislatures." Id.
163. See Rossiter, supra note 76, at 240-41; Wood, supra note 29, at 486-87.
164. Rossiter, supra note 76, at 240-41.
165. Roche, supra note 128, at 492 (describing Washington as one of Federalists'
"great assets").
166. Id. at 491.
167. The Federalist No. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
168. Id.
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formation of a wise and well-balanced government for a free
people." 69 Hamilton and Jay were reminding the people that the
"crisis" to which they had come, and which would determine "nothing
less than the existence of the UNION,"'7 was not unlike "[the] well-
grounded apprehensions of inuninent danger [that] induced the
people of America to form the memorable Congress of 1774."'I' Here
was an attempt to directly link the Federalist proposal to the
Revolution. The Continental Congress had "recommended certain
measures to their constituents," as the Federalists were doing, and
"the event [had] proved their wisdom."' Responding to the
Revolutionaries' proposals, "the great majority of the people
reasoned and decided judiciously," despite attempts by interested men
to turn them towards "objects which did not correspond with the
public good."'73 "Publius" was imploring the people to respond with
virtue and patriotism to, and thus in favor of, the Federalist proposal.
Hamilton's and Jay's hope for public virtue in the people stands
counterpoised to Madison's description of faction. In Federalist Nos.
1 and 2 the people were asked to rise above self-interest and state
prejudices to deliberate on the greater good of the nation. 74 In
Federalist No. 10, Madison explained that interests contrary to the
common good cannot be avoided, and in fact should be embraced in
the national government in order to balance them against opposing
interests.7 5 The three authors' expectations of the people are not
contradictory, but rather layered. The Constitution controls faction in
order to prevent a recurrence of the majoritarian tyrannies of the
Critical Period.76 But Madison attributes the vices of faction only to
the "public administration," not to "[t]he valuable improvements
made by the American constitutions."'" Much as the Revolutionaries
continued to value the English constitution as they revolted against
the British administration, 7 ' the Federalists sought to control the
ordinary practice of government without restricting the people in the
formation of their government. 7 9  Faction is not a danger during
169. Id. No. 2, at 7, 8 (John Jay).
170. Id. No. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
171. 1d. No. 2, at 8 (John Jay).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 2 (John Jay).
175. Id. No. 10 (James Madison).
176. See supra Part I.B (describing problems of late 1770s-1780s). John Quincy
Adams referred to the 1780s as "'this critical period.' through which America was
"'groaning under the intolerable burden of... accumulated evils."' Wood, supra note
29, at 393.
177. The Federalist No. 10, at 45,46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 38-52.
179. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 190-91 (analyzing The Federalist Papers to
conclude that "the system ultimately relies on the People's" ability to transcend
faction during a crisis).
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constitutional crises because many private interests will be
harmonized with the public good, and when combined with the public
virtue which generally rises in response to crises, the "great majority"
will "reason[] and decide[] judiciously."'80
The delegates to the "national deliberation," having decided
unanimously upon the Constitution, began the campaign to increase
their support in every state in order to have the best advantage in the
elections for the ratifying conventions. 8' They generated enough
support prior to most state conventions to win by substantial
majorities, and, except in North Carolina, to prevail in every state.1S2
Moreover, not only did they win a substantial consensus, they
required such a consensus for constitutional change. Article VII of
the Constitution required the approval of nine states- three-fourths
of the states, not including Rhode Island (and no one wanted to),"-
before the Constitution would become the supreme law." 4
Significantly, the Federalists expected future constitutional changes to
be implemented according to their example. Article V requires a
three-fourths majority of states to ratify, as does Article VII.1'
Additionally, Article V demands a two-thirds majority of Congress, or
two-thirds of the states, to propose amendments. 8 6  Though the
Framers did not need supermajorities to propose the Philadelphia
Convention, the proposal function follows their example in the
180. See The Federalist No. 2, at 8 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
181. See Rossiter, supra note 76, at 240.
182. Delaware, New Jersey and Georgia were unanimous, while the Constitution
gained a 76% majority in Connecticut. Pennsylvania was the first state to have a
hard-fought contest in a convention, but still approved it by a two-thirds majority.
Massachusetts was won by a narrow 53%, but still impressive considering a majority
of the convention delegates had originally opposed the Constitution. New Hampshire
followed suit with another narrow 55% victory for the Federalists, but only after
adjourning from February to June. The Maryland convention, which was dominated
by Federalists, ratified next by a whopping 85%-the voters of Maryland were
overwhelmingly in favor of the Constitution, even if venerable Samuel Chase was not.
South Carolina followed suit in May of 1788, ratifying with a substantial two-thirds
majority. Virginia was the ninth state to ratify (by a mere 53%), and the hardest won
state. Another bare majority approved the Constitution in New York, with lines
drawn, as they are today, between New York City and the upstate counties. Only
North Carolina voted against the Constitution, and Rhode Island "refused even to
call a convention." Both states did eventually join the Union, North Carolina in 1789
and Rhode Island in 1790. Id. at 246-54.
183. The Massachusetts Centinel reported on May 19, 1787, that Rhode Island's
absence from the Convention was "a circumstance far more joyous than grievous."
Rossiter, supra note 76, at 75-76 & n.11 (emphasis in original) (summarizing the
feeling of most Federalists).
184. U.S. Const. art. VII (stating ratification of nine states required "for the
Establishment of this Constitution").
185. Id. art. V. The nine states needed to ratify the Constitution were three-fourths
of the then-existing states, excluding Rhode Island.
186. Id. (stating that Congress may propose amendments when two-thirds of both
Houses agree or that Congress must call a convention upon application of two-thirds
of the state legislatures).
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Annapolis Convention'87 and in the final authorization from the
Confederation Congress.ls8 As Rossiter argued:
The Framers had no argument with the doctrine of majority rule;
they simply wished to insist, as their document still insists today, that
the majority be clear-cut and cool-headed on all occasions,
extraordinary on extraordinary occasions, and powerless on
occasions when the consciences of men were at issue. I
9
This two-tiered constitutionalism-a "dualist democracy" in Professor
Ackerman's words'9 -allowed the Federalists to place fundamental
law in the hands of the people, in whom the Founders believed the
"supreme power resides,"' 9' while simultaneously providing enhanced
power to a less democratic national government.1'
In the twenty-five years from Revolution to Constitution, two crises
shaped the nature of American government. Independence from
Great Britain came only when it became clear to the Revolutionaries
that there was no other way to secure their fundamental liberty from
exertions of governmental power. 93 The early enthusiasm for
American civic virtue was tempered by the realization during the
Critical Period that it was the British crisis that had elicited the selfless
response the Revolutionaries had admired and relied on in the early
state constitutions.' 94 The Founders sought drastic constitutional
reform only after it became clear that the Confederation Congress
was powerless to remedy the problems caused by factional politics in
the states.195 The Federalist solution was to place greater power in the
hands of the national government, where factions would be more
likely to counteract each other, while simultaneously limiting the
extent of that power."9 The Founders proceeded to adopt the
Constitution through deliberative assemblies that represented the
people in their capacity as sovereigns, and at each stage of the
ratification process the Federalists promoted the proposed
187. The Annapolis Convention was originally an invitation to all the states to
discuss the "'trade of the United States,"' but only five states attended. Morison,
supra note 3, at 304. It published a report that called for a meeting of all the states to
propose changes and improvements in the Articles of Confederation. Id. at 305.
188. Only five states attended the Annapolis Convention-Delaware, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Rossiter, supra note 76, at 46. Seven states-
Delaware, Georgia, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania. and
Virginia-named delegations to the Convention before the Confederation Congress
had even authorized it. Id. at 48. Although close, the two-thirds provision would have
required eight or nine states, depending on whether Rhode Island was included.
189. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
190. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 3.
191. 2 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 383 (Nov. 28, 1787) (statement of
James Wilson).
192. See Flaherty, supra note 7, at 548.
193. Supra Part I.A.
194. See supra notes 67-81, 102-21 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 114-37 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 151-57, 175-79 and accompanying text.
2225
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Constitution consistently with the consensus understanding reached in
the Philadelphia Convention. 197 To assure that the nation would
remain united under the new Constitution, the Federalists required a
substantial consensus within the Convention and among the states
before it was adopted. 198
This governmental design, and its impact on the process of higher
lawmaking, is the subject of Part II. The history of the Founding has
led constitutional scholars, particularly Bruce Ackerman, to view
higher lawmaking as a separate, distinct process from ordinary
lawmaking. The reliance on popular acclimation of the Constitution
has led Ackerman to conclude that popular movements can instigate
constitutional transformation. Other commentators have noted that
politicians overshadow the role of the citizenry in Ackerman's theory.
After discussing Ackerman's theory, Part II considers these criticisms
in light of the history outlined in Part I.
II. DUALIST DEMOCRACY & THE NATURAL ARISTOCRACY
Part I described the problems the Founders reacted to, and how
they sought to correct them. Realizing that under normal
circumstances elected representatives could not be trusted to act in
the public interest, the Founders placed fundamental laws beyond the
reach of the ordinary legislative process. 199  Ackerman's dualist
democracy best describes this system. This part analyzes Ackerman's
theory of higher lawmaking within the dualist democracy, and in
particular notes that it fails fully to consider the Founders' expectation
that, even though the People ultimately make constitutional decisions
in their collective capacity as sovereigns, a select body of citizens, the
natural aristocracy, would intervene in the decision-making process as
leaders of the popular movements Ackerman describes.
According to Ackerman, "a dualist Constitution seeks to distinguish
between two different decisions that may be made in a democracy.
The first is a decision by the American people; the second, by their
government."2" The dualist democracy is a two-tiered system of
government. On the first, or higher-lawmaking tier, the People
express the fundamental law that regulates the power of
government.2 °  On the second, or ordinary lawmaking tier,
representatives of the people conduct the day-to-day business of the
nation, but only to the extent permitted by the first tier. 2 The dualist
democracy is designed to guarantee liberty by allowing only "We the
People", as sovereigns, to limit fundamental public or private
197. See supra notes 151-66, 181-89 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 181-89 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 167-91 and accompanying text.
200. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 6.
201. Id.
202- Id.
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liberty. 3 Madison distinguished the United States Constitution from
its English counterpart by describing the latter as a "charter[] of
liberty... granted by power," and the former as a "charter[] of
power... granted by liberty."2 4 Rather than a King granting rights to
his people, Americans, who retained all rights as sovereigns, granted
power to their representatives in government. The People's
representatives could only address issues delegated to them by the
People, and the framework of the Constitution, the People's higher
law, would restrict the methods they used. Therefore, by restricting
access to the higher-lawmaking tier, the mandates of the People would
be secure from corruption, tyrannical majorities, or monarchical
executives.
The ordinary lawmaking tier was designed to encourage the
deliberation and attention to the public good that is required in higher
lawmaking. Encouragement was necessary because the Founders
viewed decision-making based on self-interest as inevitable.21
Madison's concern that "our governments are too unstable, that the
public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that
measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice
and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an
interested and overbearing majority,"2 6 generated his desire to
obviate the unfortunate evils of faction. The state governments
during the Critical Period demonstrated that factions could not be
eliminated from government, but by incorporating as many factions as
possible within the national government the possibility of any one
gaining control would be reduced. 2° The size of the United States
would allow a multiplicity of interests to enter the national
government. The struggle between these interests would preclude the
passage of any legislation not in the national interest, because "[the
differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties.., often promote
deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the
majority."2'4 The separation of powers among the three branches,
including differing modes of election to office, provided each branch
with the political independence needed to prevent power from
consolidating in one branch.
To further control abuses of power, each branch of government
retained a "partial agency" in the others, in order to act as a check
203. See 2 Bruce Ackerman, "We the People": Transformations 6 (1998).
204. Bailyn, supra note 27, at 55.
205. See Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 12 (2d ed. 1991) (stating that
civic virtue "would be unable to overcome the natural self-interest of men and
women, even in their capacity as political actors").
206. The Federalist No. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961).
207. Stone, supra note 205, at 13; see also supra notes 175-80 and accompanying
text.
208. The Federalist No. 70, at 394-95 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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upon them.2' The legislative branch, which at the time was
considered the most powerful and dangerous part of government, 10
was split into an upper and lower house.211 The latter reflects the
current will of the people, while the former ameliorates popular zeal
with experience and a longer-range perspective. 2  The Constitution
empowered the executive with a qualified veto on all legislative acts,
which the Congress could override by a supermajority.23 The Senate
was granted a veto on Presidential appointments and on treaties. 4
Tyrannical exertions of power by the President would lead to his
impeachment and removal from office.215
Wary of distant power, the People granted the federal government
only those powers enumerated in the Constitution, retaining the
remainder of their sovereignty, or granting it to the states.216 In this
way, public citizens furthest from the public would be precluded from
consolidating all power in themselves. Federalism was a principal
safeguard of liberty.1 7  The federal design gave the national
government the power to rein the states in from their abuses under
the Articles of Confederation, while leaving the states intact as
sentinels of the people's welfare.218 While federalism principles are
209. Id. No. 47, at 270 (James Madison) (emphasis omitted).
210. Id. No. 48, at 278 (James Madison).
211. U.S. Const art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers... shall be vested in a
Congress ... which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.").
212. The Federalist No. 62 (James Madison) (discussing value of the Senate).
213. This power is contained in the Presentment Clause, which states:
Every Bill ... shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President
of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return
it .... If after... Reconsideration two thirds of that House [which
originated it] shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent ... to the other
House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two
thirds of that House, it shall become a Law.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
214. Id. art. II, § 2 (requiring "two thirds of the Senators present" to concur in
treaties and consent of simple majority for all appointments of "Officers of the United
States").
215. Id. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
216. While this was implicit in the original Constitution, see James Wilson, Speech
in the State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), in 2 Documentary History, supra note 1, at
167, it was made explicit in 1791 through the Bill of Rights. U.S. Const. amend. X.
217. In fact, it was a primary argument against the necessity of a Bill of Rights.
Edmund Pendleton argued in the Virginia Convention that the states would preserve,
through state bills of rights, "Our dearest rights" of life, liberty and property. See 10
Documentary History, supra note 1, at 1199 (June 12, 1788). The federal
government's enumerated powers would not reach these subjects. Id.
218. On April 9, 1788, the Virginia Independent Chronicle published a lengthy
essay by "A Freeholder" in which he argued: "And as to the power of our [state]
assemblies being abridged, he will confess that their power to do every possible good
remains, and the power of doing mischief alone is taken from them." 9 id. at 725.
During the Virginia Convention Edmund Pendleton argued that "Our dearest
rights-life, liberty, and property, as Virginians, are still in the hands of our State
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present in Article V, they are notably muted. A national assembly,
either Congress or a constitutional convention, proposes
constitutional reform. 19 The role of the states is merely to accept or
refuse the proposal.'
Perhaps the most innovative counter to faction was the
establishment of an independent federal judiciary empowered to
review and strike down acts of the political branches that were
deemed contrary to the People's will.21 Judicial review was
innovative because it granted to a handful of unelected judges the
power to invalidate actions of democratically elected
representatives.02 It was necessary in a dualist democracy because, as
Legislature." 10 id. at 1199 (June 12, 1788). Arguing that the Constitution would not
consolidate the states, George Nicholas stated,
Every new power given to Congress is taken from the State Legislatures,
they will be therefore very watchful over them, for should they exercise any
power not vested in them, it will be an usurpation of the rights of the
different State Legislatures, who would sound the alarm to the people....
Should a struggle actually ensue.., it would terminate to the disadvantage
of the general Government, as Congress would be the object of the fears,
and the State Legislature the object of the affection of the people.
9 id. at 926-27 (June 4, 1788).
219. U.S. Const. art. V (stating that "Congress... shall propose Amendments...
or ... shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments").
220. Id. (granting power to the states, upon a two-thirds majority, to apply to
Congress for a convention and power to ratify proposed amendments, upon a three-
fourths majority). This is precisely the same role the states played in ratifying the
Constitution.
221. "Limitations" on the legislative authority, wrote Hamilton, -can be preserved
in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it
must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.
Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to
nothing." The Federalist No. 78, at 434 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). He went on to write, "If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance
between [an act and the Constitution], that which has the superior obligation and
validity ought.., to be preferred; or, in other words.., the intention of the people
[ought to be preferred] to the intention of their agents." Id. at 435. James Wilson
agreed, arguing in Pennsylvania that:
[I]t is possible that the legislature ... may transgress the bounds assigned to
it, and an act may pass, in the usual mode, notwithstanding that
transgression; but when... the judges... consider its principles and find it
to be incompatible with the superior power of the Constitution, it is their
duty to pronounce it void.
2 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 450-51 (Dec. 1, 1787). Oliver Ellsworth
argued similarly in the Connecticut Convention: "If the United States go beyond their
powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void;
and.., the national judges... will declare it to be void." 3 id. at 553 (Jan. 7, 1788).
Judicial review was "confirmed" by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury r. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The ratification debates illustrate that judicial review was
an inherent part of the Federalist proposal, and not a creation of an -activist" Chief
Justice.
222. One scholar has noted:
This ultimate power [of judicial review] is radically inconsistent with the
unwritten English constitution, which vested Parliament with ultimate
authority to enforce constitutional principles. Likewise. the power is at first
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Ackerman pointed out, the "President and Congress normally do not
have the considered support of the American people in assaulting the
principles established by past successes in constitutional politics. '223
Absent such a mandate, the Supreme Court must strike down the act
of the President or Congress, and thereby protect those past successes
of "We the People" embodied in the Constitution.224  Even
considering this potentially vast power, the judiciary was the "least
dangerous" branch in Hamilton's view,225 because of "its total
incapacity to support its usurpations by force. '226
Ackerman admits that there is a downside to the Court's role in the
dualist democracy, stating, "[t]he good news about the Court is that it
is interpreting the constitutional principles affirmed by the American
people at times when their political attention and energy was most
focused on such matters; the bad news is that the Americans who
made these considered constitutional judgments are dead. ' 227 During
periods of ordinary lawmaking elected representatives impose their
will on the people-through higher taxes, penalties for certain
conduct, restrictions on trade and business, and so forth-because the
people do not have time to concern themselves with these issues on a
daily basis.' As Ackerman puts it, the simple truth is that "during
normal politics, the People simply do not exist; they can only be
represented by 'stand-ins."' ' 9
To the extent that Article V governs the higher-lawmaking tier, the
dualist democracy is not particularly controversial. 230 The controversy
begins, however, with the question of whether the Founders
proclaimed the Article V amendment procedure to be the only
method by which the People could change their higher law.23' While
glance inconsistent with the theory of government prevalent in the late
eighteenth century, which saw the representative legislative branch as the
ultimate guarantor of constitutional government.
William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic 214 (1995).
223. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 262 (emphasis in original).
224. Id. at 262-63.
225. The Federalist No. 78, at 433-34 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
226. Id. No. 81, at 453 (Alexander Hamilton).
227. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 263.
228. "For most citizens, the benefits of political participation do not exceed the
costs. Hence, it would be 'irrational' for them to engage in political action." James
Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American
Constitutional Order, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 287, 291 (1990) (describing public choice
theory in political participation).
229. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 263.
230. See Kramer, What's A Constitution For Anyway?, supra note 24, at 886 n.5
(stating that dualist concept of lawmaking "has been a universally accepted truism
throughout American history"). Ackerman does discuss two other schools of thought
he terms "monistic democracy" and "rights foundationalists." 1 Ackerman, supra
note 10, at 7-16.
231. Compare 1 Ackerman, supra note 10 (arguing a populist theory of
constitutional transformation outside Article V based on popular movements creating
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the answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Note, it does
stress one point in the debate. The doctrine of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius2 seems, in this case, to be inapplicable because it
requires the People to accept one method of fundamental change,
which is inconsistent with the concept of popular sovereignty 33 If
"We the People"-in our collective capacity as sovereigns-today can
be bound by "We the People" two hundred years ago, how can "We
the People" still be sovereign?
As Ackerman and others have argued, an exclusive view of Article
V is inconsistent with the Founding history z3 The Founders
themselves refused to be curtailed by a prior expression of
constitutional procedure? Article XIII of the Articles of
Confederation required the approval of every state in order to
amend. 36  The Framers readily admitted that they violated this
mandate in drafting the ratification procedure in Article VII of the
Constitution. 7 As noted above, the Framers, in drafting the Article
V amendment procedure, generally followed the process they had
used to draft and ratify the Constitution.?-s Notably, therefore, the
interbranch struggle in federal government); and 2 Ackerman, supra note 203
(applying theory to Reconstruction and New Deal); and Akhil Reed Amar, The
Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L
Rev. 457 (1994) (advocating constitutional amendment by simple majorities of the
people), with Henry Paul Monaghan, "We the People"[s], Original Understanding,
and Constitutional Amendment, 96 Colum. L Rev. 121 (1996) (rejecting Amar's
historical justification for amendment outside Article V on federalism grounds).
232. "A canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies
the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative." Black's Law Dictionary 602 (7th ed.
1999).
233. Ackerman discusses this doctrine as well. 2 Ackerman, supra note 203, at 75-
77.
234. See e.g., id. at 71-81; Amar, supra note 231, at 458-61.
235. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 167-68. But see Stephen Markman, The
Amendment Process of Article V: A Microcosm of the Constitution, 12 Harv. J.L &
Pub. Pol'y 113, 115 (1989) ("It is logical and persuasive to argue that the Framers of
the Constitution intended a single method of altering the document, and... also
[that] a positive case [can] be made for the proposition that Article V is the exclusive
method of amendment....") (arguing that judicial interpretation cannot lead to
constitutional amendment).
236. Articles of Confederation art. XIII, reprinted in Rossiter, supra note 76, at 301,
307 ("[N]or shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of [the Articles];
unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the united states, and be
afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state.").
237. The Federalist No. 40 (James Madison). During the Convention, Edmund
Randolph simply argued that "[tihere are certainly reasons of a peculiar nature where
the ordinary cautions must be dispensed with." 1 Farrand, supra note 147, at 255
(June 16, 1787). The call for a convention in Congress limited the scope of the
Convention's authority to "the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of
Confederation," and required its proposals to be agreed to by Congress in addition to
the states. Rossiter, supra note 76, at 48. These instructions clearly implicated the
amendment procedures of Article XIII. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 41.
23& See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
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Framers themselves considered "We the People" unrestrained by
textual limitations.
Bruce Ackerman suggests one theory of higher lawmaking outside
the confines of Article V. 9  Ackerman proposes a five-stage
process- signaling, proposing, triggering, ratifying, and
consolidating -through which populist movements achieve
constitutional change. 40 When a movement has garnered sufficiently
broad and deep support among the citizenry, it gains a constitutional
"signal" and thereby earns the constitutional authority to place its
reform agenda at the center of sustained public scrutiny. 4'
Ackerman's primary modern signal is the Presidency, but at the
Founding was the Philadelphia Convention.242 In the proposing phase,
the higher lawmaking system encourages the movement to "focus its
rhetoric into a series of more or less operational proposals for
constitutional reform."243  These proposals confront opposition
organizing in support of the present, unchanged Constitution. 244 The
institutions opposing constitutional reform threaten the movement's
ability to succeed through textual procedures. 245  This institutional
struggle forces the movement to bypass the amendment procedure,
relying on popular support to legitimate its "illegal" method.246
Continued popular deliberation and scrutiny, along with further
promotion by reform leaders, forces the intransigent institutions to
acquiesce to the constitutional reform. 47 After this period of
239. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 266-94.
240. 2 Ackerman, supra note 203, at 66. This five-stage process is a modification of
Ackerman's original theory, which outlined a four-stage process: signaling, proposing,
mobilized deliberation, and codification. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 266-67. The
underlying theory is essentially the same.
241. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 272-75. Ackerman defines the depth of public
involvement needed for higher lawmaking as equal to the consideration given to
important personal decisions, such as buying a home. Id. at 272-73. Breadth refers to
the extent of public support a constitutional proposal receives, which Ackerman
assumes must be at least twenty percent of private citizens and thirty-one percent of
private citizens. Id. at 274-75. Ackerman examines the varying degrees of public
engagement through the difference between private citizens-those citizens
concerned with the public good but rarely making an effort to deliberate carefully,
and private citizens-those citizens who make informed judgments about the public
good. Id. at 230-31, 236-43. He suggests two extremes as well that should be
distinguished. The "perfect privatist" considers the public interest as equivalent to
self-interest. Id. at 233-34. The public citizen looks "upon citizenship as a higher
calling, the source of the deepest values to which men and women can ordinarily
aspire." Id. at 232. Ackerman assumes that a majority of the national population
consists of private citizens. Id. at 243.
242. Id. at 278; 2 Ackerman, supra note 203, at 39.
243. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 266.
244. Id. at 266-67.
245. Id.
246. See 2 Ackerman, supra note 203, at 49-50. The Federalists anticipated the
opposition of state legislatures to the Constitution, and in it included a new
ratification procedure, Article VII. Id.
247. Id. (arguing that although the Federalists sought to circumvent state
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sustained deliberation, the movement emerges from the ratification
process with even deeper and broader support, and moves to
consolidate its constitutional transformation by persuading the
remaining dissenters to accept the legality of the change. '4s
Ackerman's theory has its historical foundations in Federalist
constitutional theory-best enunciated in the Federalist Papers.249 As
precedent for his theory of constitutional amendment outside of
Article V, he uses the Article VII ratification procedure used to adopt
the Constitution, which flagrantly breached the requirements of the
Articles of Confederation. 2' He then adds the irregularities inherent
in the ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 5' to
support his theory for legitimizing the constitutional transformation-
without any pretext of written amendments-that occurred during the
New Deal.z2  According to Ackerman, understanding the modern
Constitution requires an interpretive synthesis of the textual and non-
textual changes made during the three "constitutional moments" of
American history: Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal.3"
A dualist democratic theory of higher lawmaking without written
amendments presupposes the possibility of capturing the intent and
purpose of "We the People" in order to understand the transformed
Constitution. In constructing and applying his theory, Ackerman
turns to the documentary record of the debates, speeches, and actions
of the political actors and engaged citizens, whom Ackerman dubs
"public citizens," involved in the constitutional struggleY, This
assumes that there is no difference between the statements of public
citizens and the intent of the People.
Professor Ackerman's theory has been criticized for failing to
address this point. Professor William E. Forbath wrote, "Ackerman
asserts rather than demonstrates an equivalence between the outlooks
of reform elites and those of popular movements. The latter are the
seedbed of new constitutional visions in Ackerman's theory, yet we
legislatures through the use of state ratifying conventions they still had to persuade
state legislatures to call for conventions).
248. Id. at 64-65 (pointing to final consolidation of the new Constitution when
North Carolina and Rhode Island ratified in 1789 and 1790, respectively).
249. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 165-99.
250. 2 Ackerman, supra note 203, at 71-85.
251. For example, Southern states were not permitted to send delegates to
Congress until their state legislatures had adopted the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
110-11. This coercive ratification procedure "made hash of Article Five." Id. at 111.
252. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 47-50.
253. See id at 132.
254. Ackerman describes public citizens as "high-minded men and women who
disdain high salaries to work eighty-hour weeks in crummy offices in Washington and
many other places across the nation." Id. at 233. They view "citizenship as a higher
calling, the source of the deepest values to which men and women can ordinarily
aspire." Id. at 232. This Note defines public citizens in essentially the same way,
though Ackerman focuses more on those outside elected office. Id. (citing Ralph
Nader as example).
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never glimpse them or their visions in his narratives. '255  Even
Ackerman concedes "that the voices of ordinary men and women are
oddly muffled in [his] book. ' '21 6
This lack of focus on the populist aspect of the constitutional
movement is understandable since once the movement reaches the
signaling phase, Ackerman's focus shifts entirely to the institutional
struggle between the President, Congress and the Supreme Court.'-7
In this struggle, public citizens, the actors on Ackerman's
constitutional political stage, merely represent the institutional offices
they inhabit: "I am not interested in the hidden wellsprings of their
private motives, but in the constitutional meaning of their public
actions." 8  Yet if, as Ackerman explains, "our normally elected
representatives are only 'stand-ins' for the People and should not be
generally allowed to suppose that they speak for the People
themselves," 9 there must be some criteria that public citizens must
meet in order to gain access to the higher-lawmaking tier, and
legitimately claim to be spokespersons of the People.
The background history developed in Part I demonstrates that the
Founders self-consciously expected and desired public virtue and
deliberation from themselves and their peers.216 The Revolutionaries
had based the state constitutions on the expectation of public virtue in
Americans, an expectation the Framers recognized as unsound except
during periods of crisis such as 1774-1776 and 1787-1788.261 The
proposal and ratification process required repeated deliberation on
the principles embodied in the Constitution by multiple assemblies of
public citizens.262 It also reveals that they actively sought, both in
Philadelphia and from among the state ratifying conventions, a
consensus on the proposed constitutional changes.263 They further
recognized that a political elite would be required to act on behalf of
the People, even as they adhered to the concept of popular
sovereignty.2 4 Writing to Edmund Randolph, Madison stated:
255. Forbath, supra note 16, at 1923.
256. Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 Yale L.J. 2279, 2292
(1999).
257. 2 Ackerman, supra note 203, at 20-21 (describing basic process of
constitutional change and including popular movements only through the "electoral
mandate").
258. Id. at 343 (arguing that the personal motives behind Justices Hughes' and
Roberts' switch from opposition to support of New Deal legislation is irrelevant).
259. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 236.
260. See supra notes 53-81, 138, 158-73 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 72-81, 99-121 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 147-73 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note
341; see also 2 Ackerman, supra note 203, at 57-64 (discussing ratification strategies of
Federalists and Antifederalists); Rossiter, supra note 76, at 256-57.
263. See supra notes 156-66, 181-84.
264. See Markman, supra note 235, at 115-16 (noting state ratification of the
Constitution and amendments gained only through state legislatures or conventions,
not through popular referendum).
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Whatever respect may be due to the rights of private judgment, and
no man feels more of it than I do, there can be no doubt that there
are subjects to which the capacities of the bulk of mankind are
unequal, and on which they must and will be governed by those with
whom they happen to have acquaintance and confidence. The
proposed Constitution is of this description. The great body of those
who are both for & against it, must follow the judgment of others
not their own. Had the Constitution been framed & recommended
by an obscure individual, instead of a body possessing public respect
& confidence, there can not be a doubt, that altho' it would have
stood in the identical words, it would have commanded little
attention from most of those who now admire its wisdom.... I infer
from these considerations that if a Government be ever adopted in
America, it must result from a fortunate coincidence of leading
opinions, and a0general confidence of the people in those who may
recommend it.
Professor Rakove uses this statement to argue that "it takes some
stretching of the political imagination to understand how Madison's
sentiments can be reconciled with" Ackerman's appeal to the people
for constitutional change.3 Madison seems to confirm a skeptical
view of a "recurrence to the people" in Federalist Nos. 49 and 50.67
Rakove points out that Madison criticized Jefferson's proposal in
Notes on the State of Virginia26s for "frequent appeals" to the people
for constitutional change on three grounds. -69 First, such appeals
would "deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows
on every thing.""27 Second, "future occasions were likely to be less
favorable to the process of constitutional revision that Americans had
recently (and presumably still) enjoyed."'" Third, "public discussion
and decision of a constitutional dispute" would turn on the influence
of "persons of distinguished character and extensive influence in the
community. It would be pronounced by the very men who had been
agents in, or opponents of, the measures to which the decision would
265. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, in 10 The Papers of James
Madison 355-56 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977) (persuading Randolph against
advocating for a second constitutional convention).
266. Jack N. Rakove, The Super-Legality of the Constitution, or, a Federalist
Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Neo-Federalisin, 108 Yale Li. 1931, 1955 (1999)
(analyzing Ackerman's theory of a "dualist Constitution").
267. See The Federalist Nos. 49, 50 (James Madison), see also Rakove, supra note
266, at 1955-56 (discussing Madison's criticisms of Jefferson's proposal).
268. Jefferson was proposing a new constitution for Virginia, which included a
provision authorizing the calling of a convention whenever two of the three branches
of government concur. See Jefferson, supra note 102, at 235-55.
269. Rakove, supra note 266, at 1955-57.
270. Id- at 1956 (quoting The Federalist No. 49).
271. Id
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relate. '2 72 The passions of the people, rather than reason, would guide
the decision.273
Madison's cautionary note does not present a complete picture,
however, for in discussing the state constitutions, Madison wrote:
We are to recollect that all the existing constitutions were formed in
the midst of a danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly
to order and concord; of an enthusiastic confidence of the people in
their patriotic leaders, which stifled the ordinary diversity of
opinions on great national questions; of a universal ardor for new
and opposite forms, produced by a universal resentment and
indignation against the ancient government; and whilst no spirit of
party connected with the changes to be made, or the abuses to be
reformed, could mingle its leaven in the operation. 74
Thus, as Ackerman noted, Madison did not believe situations such as
existed in 1776 would recur with great frequency, and only during
such a crisis would the passions be repressed.275 The problems that
resulted from the state constitutions stemmed from their formation
during a time when it was commonly believed that the public virtue
demonstrated by the People in 1774-1776 was a natural quality of the
American character.276 Once this was disproved by events of the
1780s,277 Madison realized that constitutional "experiments are of too
ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily multiplied."7" Resort to the
higher-lawmaking tier should be had only when necessary.
Rakove explained that in The Federalist No. 49, Madison was
"[f]ixated... on the belief that the interested, opinionated, and
impassioned impulses of the people would be the preponderant
sources of constitutional disequilibria" in future attempts at
constitutional change.279  According to Rakove, the idea that "the
people [should] ever be called upon to speak [as] vigorously [as they
did in 1787 and 1788] again" was furthest from Madison's mind.28 0
Rakove concluded that Madison's recognition that political leaders
would have to decide constitutional questions for most of the people
raised doubts as to Ackerman's reliance on the Founding to support
his normative theory of higher lawmaking: "A historical account of
either Madison's thinking in particular or Federalist theory in general
272. Id. (quoting The Federalist No. 49).
273. Id.
274. The Federalist No. 49, at 283 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
275. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 175-76.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 67-81.
277. See supra Part I.B.
278. The Federalist No. 49, at 283 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Ackerman makes a similar point based on this passage. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at
177 (arguing that Philadelphia Convention joined four features-"formal illegality,
mass energy, public-spiritedness, and extraordinary rationality" -that overcame the
hazardous nature of higher lawmaking (emphasis in original)).
279. Rakove, supra note 266, at 1957.
280. Id.
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should seek a way either to reconcile these tensions or examine theirincompatibility. '' 2"
The idea that a "deliberative body of citizens" was necessary to
decide issues for the People was commonly held.' The Federalists,
and the Revolutionaries before them, vehemently opposed hereditary
or arbitrary distinctions, believing in the basic social equality of all
people (or at least of all white, male people).28 Nevertheless, they
still believed that a natural aristocracy existed, and that from this pool
of candidates the ruling elite would arise.2 As Gordon Wood noted,
the social equality desired by the Founders was an equality of
opportunity, where merit and ability would command the distinctions
of rank and respectability:' "Even the reins of state... may be held
by the son of the poorest man, if possessed of abilities equal to that
important station."'  "The question," as Edmund Morgan articulated
it, "was how to identify this aristocracy of talent and merit, and...
convey to it the authority that flowed now from the whole people." '
The Federalist proposal, which was accepted by the People through
state conventions, was, Rakove wrote, "framed, in the first instance,
by the intervention of a deliberative body of citizens."?" That the
state delegates were viewed as speaking for the People is clear for, as
Madison reminded the House of Representatives in 1796, the
Constitution was "nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity
were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the
several State Conventions."'  Professor Joseph Ellis neatly made the
point: "Though the American republic became a nation of laws,
during the initial phase"-a higher lawmaking phase-"it also had to
be a nation of men."290
This part analyzed the dualist concept of lawmaking, and the role of
public citizens within that framework. Ackerman's theory neatly
explains the Founders' concept of popular sovereignty by separating
the role of government from the role of the People, but does not
adequately describe the role the Federalist leadership played on the
higher-lawmaking tier. Rakove and Forbath, though they recognize
the shortcomings of Ackerman's theory on this point, fail to
appreciate in their criticisms that the Founders understood that the
281. 1&
282. Wood, supra note 29, at 480.
283. Morgan, supra note 30, at 249; Wood, supra note 29, at 479.
284. Morgan, supra note 30, at 249-50; Wood, supra note 29, at 479-80.
285. Wood, supra note 29, at 478-79.
286. Id at 479 (internal quotations omitted).
287. Morgan, supra note 30, at 249 (discussing the requirements for the upper
house of early state legislatures).
288. Rakove, supra note 15, at 56 (internal quotations omitted).
289. 5 Annals of Cong. 776 (Apr. 6, 1796) (emphasis added). Madison was of
course reiterating a point argued during the Philadelphia Convention and during the
ratification process. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
290. Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation 17 (2000).
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natural aristocracy would provide leadership in constitutional politics
as well as in normal politics. The public-citizen model developed in
Part III attempts to discern when public citizens are merely "stand-
ins," and when they are "Spokespersons of the People."
III. THE PUBLIC CITIZEN IN HIGHER LAWMAKING: BRIDGING THE
GAP BETWEEN POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND ORIGINAL INTENT
This part argues that if one is to determine the People's intent from
documentary records of public citizens, indeed, if the idea of popular
sovereignty is to be more than a pleasant fiction, those public citizens
claiming a right to the higher-lawmaking tier must have a
demonstrable, legitimate claim to be "Spokespersons of the People."
By analyzing the actions and attitudes of the Founders-the natural
aristocracy and the original public citizens-a framework can be
developed to demonstrate and legitimate this claim. Under the
Founding precedent, a popular movement seeking the higher-
lawmaking tier must meet certain fundamental requirements in order
to succeed. First, the movement's public citizens must respond to a
crisis that cannot be solved without constitutional reform. Second,
they must propose constitutional reform and throughout their
deliberations remain consistent with that concept of the public good.
Third, they must pass through a period of sustained deliberation on
the constitutional proposal. In order for these deliberations to reflect
the popular understanding of the reform, public citizens cannot
deliberate with some ulterior motive in mind. Fourth, public citizens
must reach a substantial consensus in favor of the proposed
constitutional reform.
A. Constitutional Crisis
In order for a constitutional movement to begin, there must be
some event, or series of events, generating discontent with the status
quo.291 During periods of ordinary lawmaking, or "politics as usual,"
the People are not paying significant attention to the workings of
government. Work, family, and friends take precedence over, or are
at least as important as, the issues being decided by our elected
officials. 292 In essence, most people are normally too preoccupied with
291. For the series of events generating the British crisis, see discussion supra notes
44-52. Wood points out that independence from Britain was not a foregone
conclusion, but rather became the only solution to the crisis as it developed. Wood,
supra note 29, at 43-44. The Founding presents another example of crisis leading to
the development of a constitutional movement. See discussion supra Part I.B
(examining the events of the Critical Period). Crisis seems to be implicit in
Ackerman's model because two of the three constitutional moments he describes,
Founding and Reconstruction, followed on the heels of war. See 1 Ackerman, supra
note 10, at 81-82, 87; 2 Ackerman, supra note 203, at 6.
292. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 273.
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their own lives to worry about the public good. Precisely because of
this preoccupation, the People delegate responsibility for the public
good to their representatives, but only within the confines of
constitutional safeguards against misuse of this delegated authority.29
Times of crisis shake the People loose from their normal routines to
address the serious problems that ordinary lawmaking has been
unable to resolve.29 Crisis is thus a precondition for public citizens to
attain the higher-lawmaking tier, and that crisis must be one that can
only be resolved through constitutional reform.
The scope of higher lawmaking also suggests that it should only be
used in times of crisis. For example, Article V states that
amendments, either proposed by Congress or a Constitutional
Convention, "shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes."2  Allowing
the possibility of such sweeping reform would only be necessitated by
grave circumstances. Moreover, an amendment would only be
necessary when the government is unable to resolve the crisis with its
current powers, or when fundamental rights are not sufficiently
secured against governmental encroachment.
The great constitutional movements of American history have been
triggered by varied crises. The Revolutionaries responded to the
failure of English constitutionalism.2' The Federalist movement
developed as a reaction to the political crisis of the Critical Period as a
result of the inefficacies of the Articles of Confederation and the
unexpected combination of "majoritarian tyrannies" and anarchy that
had developed in the states.291 The social struggle over slavery
generated the constitutional movement led by the Reconstruction
Republicans after the Civil War.298 The economic crisis of the Great
Depression led the New Deal Democrats to revolutionize the role of
government in regulating the economy.2' In each case, the then-
current Constitution did not permit the national government to
adequately deal with the crisis. In such circumstances, the crisis
becomes one of constitutional proportions.'
293. Id. at 6; 2 Ackerman, supra note 203, at 6.
294. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 230-65.
295. U.S. Const. art. V (emphasis added). Article V provides only two exceptions
to this scope: equal suffrage in the Senate and the slave trade guarantee. Id.
296. See supra Part I.A.
297. See supra Parts LB-C.
298. 2 Ackerman, supra note 203, at 180-81.
299. Id. at 7-8.
300. Whether a triggering event rises to the level of a constitutional crisis can be
difficult to discern at times. For example, the international crises surrounding the Jay
Treaty controversy in 1796 do not clearly constitute a constitutional crisis. App. at
2252-54. First, the Framers had secured the nationalization of foreign affairs in the
Constitution. See generally Golove, supra note 123 (discussing removal of states from
treaty-making). Second, the Constitution expressly granted the President the power
to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, U.S. Coast. art. II, § 2,
though the Republican opposition had repeatedly attacked Washington's foreign
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Ackerman argues that "[d]uring normal politics, no 'public interest'
grouping is powerful enough to force its agenda to the center of
political concern, to make normal politician/statesmen treat its
questions as the critical questions they must answer if they hope to
continue to represent the People. '30 1  What makes a movement
powerful enough to accomplish this feat? When a movement has
garnered support among the people with sufficient depth and breadth
to attain a constitutional "signal," its proposal is moved to the
forefront of the government agenda.3° Such broad and deep support,
from active as well as passive citizens, can be attained only when the
citizenry has turned its attention away from self-interest to consider
the best interests of the community at large.303 A crisis is the only
thing that generates such support from anyone other than public
citizens. A public citizen may recognize early on the problems which
lead to crisis, but his or her support will only grow as the nation draws
closer to the climax.
Professor Rakove was correct to note that Madison, if not
Federalists generally, feared a continual "recurrence to the People." 304
However, the fear was based in part on the rarity of constitutional
crises.30 5  Madison must have viewed himself and his peers as
"patriotic leaders" in the "midst of a danger" in whom the people
could justifiably have an "enthusiastic confidence. ''3 6 Both Framers
and Ratifiers were unquestionably "agents in, or opponents of, the
measures to which the decision would relate."3" Significantly,
Federalists relied on the reputation and influence of the members of
the Philadelphia Convention to persuade the people to accept the
affairs powers. See Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and
the Founding of the Federal Republic 375-77 (1995) (discussing debate over
presidential capacity to declare neutrality); Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political
Battleground of the Founding Fathers 74-81 (1970) (examining debate over
commercial retaliation against Great Britain).
As a question of interpretation-the interaction of the treaty power with the
Congressional power to regulate foreign commerce-the case for a House role in
treaty-making is stronger, because the issue had not arisen under such controversial
circumstances before. See app. at 2252-53. However, as Madison's arguments suggest,
the issue had been debated in the Philadelphia Convention and during ratification,
and thus the proponents of a House role in treaty-making could not argue adequately
that the interpretive question remained open. See id. at 2252-62. Nevertheless,
considering the policy and ideological issues in dispute and the relative lack of
precedent for the Founders to follow, this Note will assume that the crisis was of
constitutional proportions. Id. at 2253-54.
301. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 270.
302. Id. at 272.
303. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 265-73, 279-81.
305. See supra text accompanying note 271.
306. The Federalist No. 49, at 283 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
307. Id. at 285. Almost all of the Framers and Ratifiers were members of Congress
or of state governments. See supra Part I.C.
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significant changes they proposed.' The gentle lobbying that
occurred to influence Washington's decision to attend is evidence
supporting this conclusion.-w Yet one must infer from his actions that
at no time was Madison concerned that the Federalists themselves
were playing on the passions of the people. Thus, once a crisis reaches
constitutional proportions, public citizens may legitimately seek the
higher-lawmaking tier, as had the Federalists. 3u
Crisis as a precondition to higher lawmaking is implicit in the
Article V procedure because, as Professor John Vile stated, "the
Founders clearly viewed the constitutional amending process as an
alternative to violent change. 311 Politicians in Congress or in state
legislatures will not propose amendments unless they believe an
extremely strong chance exists for their passage. Issues that would
garner the support of two-thirds of both Houses must be serious
indeed to hope for success. Similarly, state legislatures will not
instigate the burdensome process to call for a Constitutional
Convention unless the matter at issue seriously affects a supermajority
of states, and thus more than one region of the country. 2
B. Consistency
Once the constitutional crisis has awakened the public spiritedness
of the citizenry that, for most people, lies dormant during normal
politics,313 public citizens must propose measures for constitutional
reform that address the public good. The dualist democracy
recognizes that public virtue is usually in short supply, but relies on it
during periods of higher lawmaking to assure that decisions are made
in the public interest. 14 Without the restraints placed on public
citizens in ordinary lawmaking, public virtue is a critical safeguard.
The constitutional movement, forming as the crisis builds, focuses
public concern on its agenda for constitutional reform. This focus
transforms public concern to public virtue by offering a method (the
movement's agenda) through which citizens, public and private, may
deliberate upon the public good.15 In other words, public citizens, in
308. Rossiter, supra note 76, at 239-40 & n.
309. See 3 Farrand, supra note 147, at 22; Rossiter, supra note 76. at 102.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 274-76.
311. John R. Vile, Constitutional Change in the United States: A Comparative
Study of the Role of Constitutional Amendments, Judicial Interpretations, and
Legislative and Executive Actions 1 (1994).
312. U.S. Const. art. V (requiring Congress to call a Convention on application of
two-thirds of state legislatures).
313. "Americans can be expected to transcend factional politics only 'in the midst
of a danger which represse[s] the passions."' 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 176
(alteration in original) (analyzing Madison's Federalist No. 49).
314. See supra notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
315. Cf. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 287 (discussing the increased deliberative
response to a constitutional proposal).
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proposing constitutional change, define the "public good" for
purposes of public debate, and the degree to which they adhere to
their definition-their reform proposal-will affect the People's
ability to resolve the crisis.
Consistency of message is thus crucial to developing the consensus
among the public and private citizenry necessary in higher lawmaking.
If public citizens do not remain true to their proposals for
constitutional reform, the citizenry sought to be mobilized in its
support will become confused as to the ultimate goal, resulting in
factional disputes both inside and outside the movement. The burden
to maintain the consistency of the movement's message, and thereby
public virtue, rests on the public citizens leading the movement. As
Ackerman stated, "There can be no substitute for leadership if the
movement's initiative isn't to disintegrate into ideological chaos at the
very moment it comes to the forefront." '316 Federalists demonstrated
the value of consistency in constitutional politics during the
ratification debates.317
The Founders demanded consistency in the Article V process by
making constitutional proposals in written form. Written
amendments provide a focal point for public debate.318 They highlight
the changes to be made, and allow public citizens to elaborate a
relatively consistent understanding of the text. Written proposals
make it possible for multiple assemblies of public citizens to debate
and adopt the same constitutional change. Without the advanced
communication technologies of today, written amendments were the
only way to achieve this consistency at the Founding.
The debate within the Federalist camp largely ended in the
Philadelphia Convention. In his final speech, Benjamin Franklin
expressed the position advocated by many Federalists during
ratification:
I confess that there are several parts of this [C]onstitution which I do
not at present approve, but I am not sure I shall never approve
them ....
316. Id. at 281.
317. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
318. At least one scholar has argued that Article V is the method of constitutional
change used by "ordinary government," and that the People may change the
Constitution by simple majority using any method they choose. Amar, supra note 231,
at 460-64. While this does explain some amendments, such as the eighteenth
Amendment, even an ill-considered change establishing Prohibition cannot succeed
without some popular support. A better view, with a firmer grip on popular
sovereignty, allows the People a choice of what method to use to change
constitutional law, but still requires the support of a populist constitutional
movement. Prohibition is better explained as a popular movement gaining the
higher-lawmaking tier without the broad and deep support of the citizenry. Professor
Ackerman calls this phenomenon a "false positive." See 1 Ackerman, supra note 10,
at 278-79.
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... Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no
better, and because I am not sure, that it is not the best. The
opinions I have had of its errors, I sacrifice to the public good- I
have never whispered a syllable of them abroad- Within these
walls they were born, and here they shall die.319
Here was the preeminent Franklin subtly telling his peers that they
must speak in one voice when they present the Constitution to the
people. The Federalist Papers are perhaps the best example of this
consistency of message from the Federalists, coming as they did from
three writers, two of whom ultimately would espouse markedly
different visions of the Constitution. 20
Not everyone will share the movement's understanding of the
public good. For example, American Loyalists did not view British
actions in the same light as the Revolutionaries." During the
ratification debates, Antifederalists argued that the Constitution was
contrary to the public good as strenuously as Federalists argued that it
promoted the public good.3z Even without considerations of self-
interest, ambition or greed, the public good is something that can be
vigorously debated. Gordon Wood commented that "[n]o phrase
except 'liberty' was invoked more often by the Revolutionaries than
'the public good."'' 323 The "spirit of '76," as Madison recalled, arose
due to a crisis and prevented a "spirit of party connected with the
changes to be made, or the abuses to be reformed," from mingling "its
leaven in the operation."324 Thus, public citizens must define the
public good, through their proposal for constitutional reform, for
public debate.3'
319. 2 Farrand, supra note 147, at 641-43 (Sept. 17, 1787).
320. Kesler, supra note 158, at xii-xiii; see also supra text accompanying note 158
(noting conformity of James Wilson despite his desire for more nationalistic
government). The 1790s would find Madison and Hamilton on opposing sides of
many constitutional debates, notably over the National Bank and the Jay Treaty.
Rakove, supra note 15, at 350-65; see also app. at 2255-56, 2257-62.
321. Wood, supra note 29, at 3-4.
322. See "Brutus", No. I (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in id. at 269, 270-71, 276;
"Brutus", No. VI (Dec. 27, 1787), reprinted in id. at 280, 284-85; "Centinel", No. I
(Oct. 5, 1787), reprinted in id. at 227, 230; "John DeWitt", No. II (Oct. 27, 1787),
reprinted in The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates
194, 196 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986).
323. Wood, supra note 29, at 55.
324. The Federalist No. 49, at 283 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
325. The debates on the Jay Treaty reveal three points on the issue of consistency.
First, by proposing a role for the House in treaty-making, the Republicans were
arguing inconsistently with the Federalist movement. App. at 2258-63. While this
demonstrates that they were not continuing the Federalist period of higher
lawmaking, it still raises the possibility that they were presenting a new proposal for
constitutional reform and in effect attempting to gain the higher-lawmaking tier in
their own right. Id. at 2262-63. For further discussion on this point, see infra notes
333,369 and accompanying text.
Second, Washington and the Federalist party, while arguing consistently with the
Federalist movement, were not proposing new reform. Rather, they were defending a
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C. Deliberation
The considered judgment of decision-makers clearly should be a
necessary element of all lawmaking. Deliberation can mean many
things in ordinary lawmaking. A representative (for the People do
not make the decisions directly in ordinary lawmaking) might consider
his own interest, his constituents' interest, or his party's interest.326
His decision is rarely made, however, after deliberation on the present
and future national interest-what Ackerman refers to as "the rights
of citizens and the permanent interests of the community. '327  As
discussed above, if his decision is contrary to those rights or those
permanent interests, the Constitution protects the People from that
decision. 321 In higher lawmaking, deliberation becomes two-fold,
requiring the considered judgment of the People, the ultimate
decision-makers, and those public citizens claiming to speak for the
People.
While the People spoke through the state conventions, it must be
remembered that the delegates themselves provided a filter through
which the voice of the People had to pass which had the potential to
distort or misrepresent the People's true intent.32 9 The public citizen's
prior mandate of the people. Professor Lynch argued that, in the national bank and
spending power debates, the Federalists had argued "for a construction of the
Constitution that would in their view take care of the practical needs of the nation."
Lynch, supra note 15, at 155. During these earlier debates, "a broad construction of
the Constitution clearly advanced the good of the country, [while] a strict construction
would have unduly constricted governmental or presidential operations." Id. In the
Jay Treaty debates, the broad construction offered by Madison and the Republicans
did not provide the "public good" sought by the Federalist movement in 1787-88, and
again in 1793-efficiency and secrecy in the conduct of foreign affairs-that was
achieved by the placement of the conduct of foreign affairs with the President and the
Senate. See The Federalist No. 64, at 360 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It
seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect
secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite." (emphasis in original)); see
also id. No. 70, at 391-92 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[A]II men of sense will agree in the
necessity of an energetic executive [and] [t]hat unity is conducive to energy will not be
disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the
proceedings of [a unitary executive]."); 5 Annals of Cong. 760 (1796) (message of
Pres. Washington) (stating need for secrecy in foreign negotiations).
Third. the Federalist party had no proposal for constitutional reform, mainly
because they were satisfied with the operation of the Constitution. The Jay Treaty
was approved by two-thirds of the Senate, and ratified by the President. App. at 2263,
2266. The position taken by Washington was consistent with a prior decision of "We
the People", as opposed to a prior proposal of "We the People". Thus, the
Federalists were no longer acting as "Spokespersons of the People," but rather as
their normal representatives.
326. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 243-50 (discussing various organizational
pressures on politicians during "normal politics").
327. Id. at 231, 235, 352 n.4. Madison referred to "the rights of other citizens" and
"the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." The Federalist No. 10, at
46 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 200-29.
329. Cf Forbath, supra note 16, at 1924 ("The election returns are no substitute for
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purpose in deliberating upon the movement's constitutional proposal
must be the adoption of the proposal. If his or her purpose is
something other than the attainment of the movement's goals, the
public citizen is not speaking for the People. Madison addressed this
possibility in considering the failures of the state constitutions.
Rakove summarized Madison's point:
Artful legislators "with interested views" could always find ways to
sacrifice "the interest, and views, of their Constituents" for their
own purposes, and then to have their "base and selfish measures,
masked by pretexts of public good and apparent expediency." Even
"honest" representatives would often fall prey to "a favorite leader,
veiling his selfish views under the professions of public good, and
varnishing his sophistical arguments with the glowing colours of
popular eloquence." 330
The same could be said of public citizens in higher lawmaking. Mere
professions of the public good in the service of selfish ends should not
be legitimated as deliberations on "the rights of citizens and the
permanent interests of the community. ' 331 That said, it is entirely
legitimate when self-interest coincides with the movement's agenda.
Indeed, self-interest is often what instigates a movement's early
adherents. As the crisis builds, that self-interest becomes the public
interest, and those who are not directly affected by the crisis join the
movement for the public good. Thus, for example, while some of the
Framers stood to benefit from a stronger national government
because of their speculation in western lands, or their purchase of
public securities, this interest did not detract from their claim to speak
for the People because their interest coincided with the Federalist
proposal, and the public good.3  Clinton Rossiter, commenting on the
hard bargaining that occurred over the issue of representation during
the Convention, stated, "we must remember that no true exercise in
constitution-making can be entirely rational and non-political." '3
examining how popular ideas... are tallied and translated or suppressed and erased
in relations among social movements [and political actors].").
330. Rakove, supra note 15, at 49.
331. See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
332. Clinton Rossiter notes that twelve of the fifty-five Framers were speculating in
western lands, and approximately two dozen owned state or national securities.
Rossiter, supra note 76, at 122-23.
333. Id. at 157. But it must at least be largely rational and non-political. For
example, the Republican opposition's argument in 1796 that the House of
Representatives must have a voice in the treaty-making process was made in order to
place Jay's Treaty at the forefront of public debate in the upcoming presidential
election. App. at 2263-66. The coincidence of an initially unpopular treaty and the
retirement of George Washington, who would have retained the presidency with ease
if he had so desired, enticed the Republicans into a constitutional proposal intended
to encourage voters to dislodge the Federalist party from the loci of foreign affairs
power-the executive branch and the Senate. Id. at 2264-66. It was not a deliberative
attempt to reform the Constitution, but rather a means by which the Republicans
sought to control foreign policy-by placing Jefferson in the White House. Id. at
2245
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In a nation based on popular sovereignty, any change in the
Constitution is a change in the amount of power delegated by the
People to the government.3" Such a delegation must be a deliberative
one; otherwise it should not override the prior considered judgment of
the People that it now seeks to amend. Fortunately, crisis not only
breeds public virtue, but also public discourse.335 The media would
cover the crisis, and any proposal for constitutional reform would only
increase that coverage.336 The difficulty, and thus the value, of greater
deliberation in higher lawmaking lies in the movement's ability to
sustain that public discourse long enough to successfully navigate the
higher-lawmaking tier. 37
Public citizens claiming to be "Spokespersons for the People" lead
the public discourse and transfer it into the institutional arena-
Congress, the President, the Supreme Court, and the state
governments.338 Article V makes this clear by requiring Congress and
every state legislature to consider a proposed amendment and voice
its opinion.339 They must encourage the public debate in order to gain
2265-66.
It was a means, in fact, that President Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison
readily abandoned in 1803 in the Louisiana Purchase. Joseph J. Ellis, American
Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson 248-50 (First Vintage ed. 1998). "John
Quincy Adams, one of the few senators to oppose the legislation, observed that
Jefferson would possess 'an assumption of implied power greater.., than all the
assumptions of implied powers in the years of the Washington and Adams
administrations put together."' Id. at 249-50 (alteration in original). In Jefferson's
defense, he remained convinced that the purchase of foreign territory required an
amendment to the Constitution. When the possibility that Napoleon would change
his mind arose, however, Jefferson decided that "the less that is said about my
constitutional difficulty, the better; and that it will be desirable for Congress to do
what is necessary in silence." Id. at 249 (emphasis in original) (quoting Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (Aug. 18, 1803)).
334. James Wilson, in his Law Lectures of 1790, described popular sovereignty as
the "one great principle... animat[ing] all the others ... that the supreme or
sovereign power of the society resides in the citizens at large; and that, therefore, they
always retain the right of abolishing, altering, or amending their constitution, at
whatever time, and in whatever manner, they shall deem it expedient." 2 Ackerman,
supra note 203, at 79 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 The Works of James Wilson 79
(Robert McCloskey ed., 1967)).
335. Consider the drastic increase in conversation during the weeks following the
2000 Presidential election about both the Twelfth Amendment and the Electoral
College relative to, say, the last century.
336. See Vile, supra note 311, at 103 (noting "attendant publicity likely to
surround" the amendment process). In addition to the modem concept of media, the
newspapers and pamphleteers of the eighteenth century are included as well.
337. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 285-88.
338. For example, Madison brought the issue of the House of Representatives' role
in treaty-making into the Virginia legislature in 1795, which triggered a round of
resolutions on a proposed constitutional amendment expressly giving the House a
role. See app. at 112-13. The amendment was supported by five states, including
Virginia, but rejected by nine others. See app. at 113. Other Republicans
subsequently brought the issue before the House itself. App. at 103-04.
339. U.S. Const. art. V; see also Vile, supra note 311, at 103 (noting that "measures
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additional support, as well as to motivate their established base of
supporters. Further, deliberation is necessary to achieve the
consensus necessary to transcend faction; to gain Madison's "universal
ardor for new and opposite forms" on the "great national question[]"
at hand.' ° The model for deliberation of this kind is the Convention.
As Washington informed the Confederation Congress in his letter
accompanying the proposed Constitution:
In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view,
that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true
American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our
prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This
important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our
minds, led each State in the Convention to be less rigid on points of
inferior magnitude, than might have been otherwise expected; and
thus the Constitution, which we now present, is the result of a spirit
of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which the
peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable., "
This purpose-oriented approach to deliberation was critical to the
success of the Federalist movement.
The purpose of the Philadelphia Convention was the resolution of
the crises of the 1780s. 42 The solution, at least from the Federalists'
perspective, was a stronger, more energetic national government (with
the necessary restraints on power to preserve liberty, of course).'
The danger of deviating from this goal arose in the Convention over
the issue of slavery.' On August 21, 1787, Luther Martin proposed a
change to the Constitution allowing a prohibition or tax on the
importation of slaves." Martin argued that the three-fifths clause'
would encourage importation, that continued importation would
increase the risk of slave uprisings that would force the Union to come
to that state's defense, that slavery was inconsistent with the principles
of the Revolution, and that slavery's inclusion in the Constitution was
dishonorable to the American character. 7 John Rutledge of South
are unlikely to be incorporated into the fundamental law without due 'deliberation
and consideration' (quoting Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221,226 (1920)).
340. The Federalist No. 49, at 283 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
For further discussion, see supra note 274 and accompanying text.
341. Letter of the Convention to Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), in Rossiter, supra note
76, at 342.
342. See supra Parts I.B-C.
343. See Rossiter, supra note 76, at 45-49.
344. See generally Ellis, supra note 290, at 17-18 (arguing that removing slavery
from the political debate helped secure the "fragile union").
345. 2 Farrand, supra note 147, at 364 (Aug. 21, 1787).
346. The three-fifths clause allowed three-fifths of all slaves in each state to be
counted in determining the apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives.
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States... according to their respective Numbers...
by adding to the whole Number of free Persons ... three fifths of all other Persons.").
347. 2 Farrand, supra note 147, at 364 (Aug. 21, 1787).
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Carolina responded that "[t]he true question at present is whether the
South[ern] States shall or shall not be parties to the Union."' 8  The
line in the sand had been clearly drawn. Gouvernor Morris of
Pennsylvania had earlier declared that "[h]e would never concur in
upholding domestic slavery." 9 Charles Pinckney had flatly declared
that South Carolina would "never receive the plan if it prohibits the
slave trade." 35° Both North and South had said "never," but both
sides knew that the purpose of the Convention was the crafting of a
stronger national government, not the abolition or guarantee of
slavery. 3 1 A committee decided the issue over the next two days, with
the result being a twenty-year slave trade guarantee for the South, and
the ability to tax such importations for the North.352 The issue of
slavery tragically would not be resolved for another eighty years, but
the compromise developed in Philadelphia allowed the Framers to
complete their work.353
D. Consensus
Consensus among public citizens operates as a barrier in higher
lawmaking to the politics of faction. While separation of powers,
federalism, judicial review, and other restraints in the Constitution
seek to alleviate the influence of faction in normal politics, these
safeguards are largely absent in higher lawmaking.3 By requiring a
348. Id.
349. Id. at 221 (Aug. 8, 1787).
350. Id. at 364 (Aug. 21, 1787).
351. Madison recorded that "Mr. King... had not made a strenuous opposition to
[the admission of slaves] heretofore because he had hoped that this concession would
have produced a readiness.., to strengthen the Gen[eral] Gov[ernmentj." Id. at 220
(Aug. 8. 1787). Roger Sherman "regarded the slave-trade as iniquitous; but the point
of representation having been Settled after much difficulty [and] deliberation, he did
not think himself bound to make opposition." Id. at 220-21. The Connecticut
delegation consistently worked towards compromise on the sectional disputes which
arose. See Rakove, supra note 15, at 86.
352. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9; see also Rossiter, supra note 76, at 185-87.
353. Rakove, supra note 15, at 58. Both sides of the debate realized that an
attempt at resolving the issue of slavery could have threatened the existence of the
Union, the very thing they had come to Philadelphia to strengthen. Id.; Rossiter,
supra note 76, at 186. "The underlying reason for this calculated orchestration of
non-commitment was obvious: Any clear resolution of the slavery question one way
or the other rendered ratification of the Constitution virtually impossible." Ellis,
supra note 290, at 93.
354. Federalism does play a role in Article V, but the states are limited to approval
or rejection of the proposed amendment, and cannot modify or change the proposal.
See U.S. Const. art. V; see also supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text. Separation
of powers is absent from the Article V process, only Congress and state legislatures
have a role. U.S. Const. art. V; see also supra notes 207-15 and accompanying text
(discussing the mechanics of the separation-of-powers doctrine). Ackerman replaces
federalism principles with separation of powers principles in his theory. See I
Ackerman, supra note 10, at 259-61. As for judicial review, the Supreme Court
cannot review the constitutionality of a constitutional amendment. Ackerman's
theory incorporates a major role for the Supreme Court in higher lawmaking, but the
2248 [Vol. 69
2001] PUBLIC CITIZENS & THE CONSTITUTION
supermajority to support the movement's proposal,355 the Founders
required more support than any one faction can bring to bear. The
Federalist movement was a combination of many interests. As
Clinton Rossiter points out, even the Framers were a fairly diverse
group-farmers, doctors, lawyers, merchants, plantation owners and
tradesmen. 56 From all regions of the nation, a variety of religions,"51
and a range of economic positions (though tending towards the high
end),a58 the Framers highlighted the diversity of social and cultural
backgrounds in America. Perhaps most divisive of all, the Framers
came from large and small states, and some were slave owners and
some decidedly were not.319  This diversity merely confirms the
plethora of interests encompassed by the Federalist movement.
As a crisis develops, public citizens will propose many possible
remedies. Through the deliberative process these diverse possibilities
are molded into a common proposal around which a consensus may
be built.31 This process was critical to the Federalist movement, and
though many voices and ideas were heard prior to 1787, it began in
earnest with James Madison early in that year.- Madison privately
circulated his summary of the problems then plaguing the nation in his
"Vices of the Political System of the United States." ' While awaiting
the arrival of a quorum of delegates in Philadelphia, and once his
fellow Virginians were privy to his view of the political crisis, he
convinced them to meet "two or three hours every day, in order to
form a proper correspondence of sentiments." 3' Through these
meetings Madison, Washington, Randolph, and the other Virginia
delegates formed the Virginia Plan, which they would jointly
propose.36 Entering the Convention with a relatively unified group,
and a concrete proposal, gave the Virginians the initiative.1 To this
role is in codifying the constitutional changes, not in reviewing them. See id. at 263-64.
Judicial review, according to Ackerman, safeguards prior acts of higher lawmaking
from the vicissitudes of normal politics, and is not in itself an avenue to higher
lawmaking. Id. at 261-63 (rejecting Alexander Bickel's "countermajoritarian
difficulty"); see also supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text (discussing the
purposes of judicial review).
355. The Founders did this quite clearly in Article V by requiring supermajorities
even to propose an amendment, and by requiring approval of three-fourths of the
state legislatures to ratify. U.S. Const. art. V.
356. Rossiter, supra note 76, at 67-134.
357. Id. at 126.
358. See id. at 122-23.
359. Id.
360. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 281.
361. Rossiter, supra note 76, at 107-08.
362. Wood, supra note 29, at 406.
363. Letter of George Mason to George Mason, Jr. (May 20, 1787), in 3 Farrand,
supra note 147, at 23.
364. Edmund Randolph, as Governor of Virginia, actually proposed the Virginia
Plan on the floor of the Convention on May 29, 1787. Rossiter, supra note 76, at 144.
365. See id. at 146.
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plan were added Charles Pinckney's plan,366 the New Jersey Plan,367
and other ideas, views and opinions throughout the Convention, but it
was not until they had reached a substantial consensus on the final
version of the Constitution that the Framers adjourned to present the
plan to Congress and the People.
Consensus among public citizens legitimates the claim that they act
on behalf of "We the People". It also provides a safeguard against
unwarranted attempts to act on the People's behalf.36 The conclusion
of the Jay Treaty debates is an example of how this safeguarding
function operates. While the public citizens involved in the debates
over Jay's Treaty split nearly down the middle on the constitutional
issue-the House's role in treaty-making-the Federalists assembled a
sufficient consensus to block the Republican attempt to gain the
higher-lawmaking tier with their proposal for reform.369 The failure of
either Federalists or Republicans to gain a consensus reveals that the
Federalist movement had lost the higher-lawmaking tier, and that the
Republicans had not yet attained it.
CONCLUSION
Questions of original intent and higher lawmaking depend upon a
correlation between the understanding of the People and the
expressions of public citizens speaking for them. The public-citizen
model proposed in this Note provides an interpretive method through
which that correlation can be verified. Requiring a constitutional
crisis as a precondition to higher lawmaking corresponds to the
Founders' view of when higher lawmaking is appropriate. It also
demands an examination of the context in which public citizens are
acting, providing a deeper understanding of the issues and avoiding
the use of history "lite. 370 Crisis alone, however, merely creates a
need for constitutional change; it does not provide a basis for
particular citizens-public or private-to adopt such change. The
Founders realized that in a republic, particularly in one as large as the
United States, decisions had to be made by representatives, even on
366. Pinckney's plan for a new federal government was submitted on May 29 and
largely ignored, id. at 145, though this did not prevent him from claiming a leading
role as a Framer. In 1819, then-Secretary of State John Quincy Adams requested a
copy of Pinckney's plan to include in the Journal of the Convention, which Adams
planned to publish. Id. at 286 n. Pinckney submitted what was later found to be a
preliminary draft of the committee of detail, but Adams unwittingly included it in the
Journal anyway. Id.
367. William Paterson introduced the New Jersey Plan on June 15, 1787, the
principal feature of which was equal suffrage for each state in both houses of
Congress. Id. at 147-50.
368. Cf. 1 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 272-75 (requiring "extraordinary support"
among populace before a public citizen may claim to speak for the People).
369. See id. at 2266-67.
370. See Flaherty, supra note 7, at 523-25 (discussing misuses of history).
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questions of fundamental law. The public-citizen model here
articulated utilizes the criteria the Founders themselves accepted as
necessary, through their actions if not through their text. Proposing
reform, maintaining consistency of message, reappraising through
deliberation their proposal, and consensus building were all important
steps in the constitutional transformations that occurred during the
Revolution and in the Constitution. By utilizing these criteria, the
public-citizen model retains a focus on the public citizens that
Ackerman's theory recognizes as important but fails to critique. Most
importantly, the proposed public-citizen model reinvigorates the idea
of popular sovereignty in a dualist representative democracy by
legitimating the public citizen's claim to speak for the People.
APPENDIX*
THE JAY TREATY OF 1795
This Appendix provides supporting history to the application of the
public citizen model outlined in Part III. For ease of reference, it is
structured to correspond generally with the model's criteria.
A controversy developed over America's first major treaty under
the Constitution-the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Great
Britain commonly referred to as the Jay Treaty or Jay's Treaty, after
its negotiator John Jay.' Although Jay had completed negotiations in
1794,2 and the Senate consented to the treaty in June of 1795,3 it was
not until April of 1796 that the House passed an appropriations bill
for the money necessary to carry the treaty into effect.4 The
controversy centered on the House's role in treaty-making,
particularly in reference to treaties covering issues which are the
subject of Congress' enumerated powers, such as declaring war and
regulating foreign commerce.' The Jay Treaty debates have been
used to support arguments for and against congressional-executive
agreements, 6 and the question of whether treaties are self-executing.7
* Appendix to Robert W. Scheef, Note, "Public Citizens" and the Constitution:
Bridging the Gap Between Popular Sovereignty and Original Intent, 69 Fordham L.
Rev. 2201 (2001).
1. Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 415 (1993).
2. Id. at 410.
3. Id. at 417-19.
4. Id. at 449.
5. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 cl. 3, 11.
6. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv.
L. Rev. 799, 916-19 (1995) (noting the constitutional objections to and debate over the
constitutionality of congressional-executive agreements - international agreements
"ratified" by simple majorities in the House and Senate); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking
Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221 (1995) (challenging Ackerman and Golove's
view that congressional-executive agreements are consistent with the text of the
Constitution).
7. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution,
and the Original Understanding, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1955, 2074-75, 2080-86 (1999)
(using Jay Treaty debates to support conclusion that treaties are not self-executing);
see also Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original
Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land", 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2095
(1999) (responding to Yoo's historical claims through period of ratification but not
into the 1790s).
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The status of 1795-96 as a period of higher or ordinary lawmaking is
thus relevant to these contemporary debates.
A. The Foreign Affairs Crisis in the 1790s
While the critical issue of 1787-88 was the adoption of the
Constitution, the critical problem of the 1790s was its operation8 The
political leaders of the time had vast experience at their disposal, but
nevertheless were bereft of any precedents for deciding issues under
the new Constitution.' This problem was felt nowhere more keenly
than in the area of foreign affairs." The problems that faced the
United States during the 1780s-the failure of American debtors to
pay British creditors as required by the Treaty of Paris, and the
continued British occupation of the forts along the Great Lakes"-
still existed as Washington assumed the Presidency. 2 Additionally,
Algerian pirates and the British Navy were interrupting American
commerce in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, the latter adding insult
to injury by impressing American seamen. 3 To the joy of Americans,
the French Revolution erupted in 1789, signaling the spread of
republicanism to Europe. 4 When France declared war on Great
Britain (and most of Europe) in 1793, American involvement on the
side of France was implicated by the terms of the Treaty of Alliance of
1788.15 To the west, access to the Mississippi River, considered vital to
southern interests and western expansion, remained uncertain unless
an agreement could be reached with Spain. 6 Thus, America was
8. See Joanne B. Freeman, The Election of 1800: A Study in the Logic of Political
Change, 108 Yale L.J. 1959, 1960 (1999).
9. In analyzing Ackerman's work, Professor Freeman has argued that -in the
Founding period... there was neither a single defining 'constitutional moment' nor a
prolonged period of 'normal politics.'... With the Constitution yet untried and
untested, 'normal' was a relative term, and any political controversy had potential
constitutional significance." Id.
10. See Joseph Charles, The Origins of the American Party System 6 (Harper
Torchbook ed. 1961); Joseph M. Lynch, Negotiating the Constitution: The Earliest
Debates over Original Intent 114 (1999).
11. See Scheef, supra note *, at 2217.
12- See Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding
Fathers 15-16 (1970).
13. Americans viewed the British as responsible for Algerian attacks on American
shipping. Id at 116; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 1, at 378. Impressment of
American seamen became more serious later in the decade, but the practice had
begun in British ports prior to 1794, and would later expand onto the high seas.
Combs, supra note 12, at 155 (discussing John Jay's failure to include article in Jay
Treaty banning impressment).
14. Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 1, at 308-11.
15. See Lynch, supra note 10, at 114-15 (discussing debate over Washington's
response to war in his Proclamation of Neutrality).
16. Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 1, at 439 (discussing settlement with Spain in
1796 of "everything [Americans] had been vainly demanding since the end of the
Revolution" including free navigation of Mississippi River); see also Jack N. Rakove,
Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 43 (First
2001] 2253
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
literally surrounded by foreign problems-the British to the north and
northwest; the Spanish to the west and south; and the French, British,
and Barbary pirates to the east.
With Republicans in overwhelming control of the House of
Representatives, this opposition had the potential to disrupt the
operation of American foreign policy in a way that had serious
constitutional implications." Though Washington, with the consent of
the Senate, had previously entered into treaties, none had such far-
reaching consequences as did Jay's Treaty. 8 At stake in the Jay
Treaty was America's role in the spread of republicanism
internationally, and its role in the ongoing struggle between France
and Great Britain. 9 These were much more serious issues than the
previous treaties had implicated. For many Americans at the time,
they struck at the core of republican principles, and the meaning of
the American Revolution.2" For Jefferson at least, the idea that the
"least democratic" branches of government-the Executive, with its
hints of monarchy, and the Senate, representative of state interests-
would decide these issues was antithetical to the Revolutionary
legacy."1 When Washington placed the treaty before the House in
March of 1796 for the appropriations necessary to carry it into effect,
Congressional Republicans forced the issue of the treaty power in a
final attempt to block Jay's Treaty.2
Vintage Books ed. 1997) (remarking on Madison's concern for access to Mississippi as
impetus for revision of Articles of Confederation).
17. Republicans controlled almost two-thirds of the seats in the House of
Representatives in the Fourth Congress. Charles, supra note 10, at 94 (showing chart
of party-line voting).
18. 5 Annals of Cong. 780-81 (1796) (statement of Rep. Madison) (distinguishing
Jay Treaty from Treaty with Algiers and several Indian Treaties).
19. Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 1, at 415; Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx:
The Character of Thomas Jefferson 188-89 (First Vintage ed. 1998) ("It bet, in effect,
on England rather than France as the hegemonic European power of the future.").
20. As Jefferson wrote:
A bolder party-stroke was never struck. For it certainly is an attempt of a
party which finds they have lost their majority in one branch of the
legislature to make a law by the aid of the other branch, & of the executive,
under color of a treaty, which shall bind up the hands of the adverse branch
from ever restraining the commerce of their patron-nation.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 21, 1795), in 16 The Papers of
James Madison 88-89 (J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter The Madison
Papers]. The Jay Treaty was "really nothing more than a treaty of alliance between
England and the Anglomen of this country against the legislature and people of the
United states [sic]." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Rutledge (Nov. 30,
1795), in 28 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 542 (John Catanzariti et al. eds., 2000).
21. "The Anglomen have in the end got their treaty through, and so far have
triumphed over the cause of republicanism." Ellis, supra note 19, at 193 (quoting
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (July 10, 1796)).
22. Lynch, supra note 10, at 144-45.
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B. Consistency: Hamilton, Washington & The Federalist Defense
On April 1, 1796, Representative Thomas Blount proposed the
following resolution:
Resolved, That, it being declared by the second section of the second
article of the Constitution, "that the President shall have power, by
and with the advice of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-
thirds of the Senate present concur," the House of Representatives
do not claim any agency in making Treaties; but, that when a Treaty
stipulates regulations on any of the subjects submitted by the
Constitution to the power of Congress, it must depend, for its
execution, as to such stipulations, on a law or laws to be passed by
Congress. And it is the Constitutional right and duty of the
House ... to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of
carrying such Treaty into effect, and to determine and act thereon,
as, in their judgment, may be most conducive to the public good.'
The resolution passed on April 7 by a vote of fifty-seven to thirty-five,
with eleven members absent.24 Madison supported the resolution, and
had advocated this position during the month-long debate in the
House over the constitutionality of the Jay Treaty.?2 Madison's
opposition to a commercial alliance with Great Britain forced him to
argue a position inconsistent with the Federalist proposal, not to
mention with his own previous statements.26
Though Madison was generally viewed as the leader of the
Republicans, 27 particularly in Congress, the opening moves against the
Jay Treaty were made by Edward Livingston of New York and Albert
Gallatin of Pennsylvania.' Livingston proposed a resolution
requesting Jay's negotiating instructions from Washington "together
with the correspondence and other documents relative to [the Jay]
Treaty," predicating his resolution on the possible unconstitutionality
of the Treaty.29 In response to demands for reasons for such a
request, Livingston raised the House's power of impeachment, but
said his "principal reason... was a firm conviction that the House
were vested with a discretionary power of carrying the Treaty into
23. 5 Annals of Cong. 771 (1796) (statement of Rep. Blount). This resolution was
accompanied by a second stating that the House may request information from the
President without stating its purpose for the application. Id. at 771-72.
24. Id. at 782-83. The final vote was recorded as sixty-three to thirty-six, with six
absent members recorded as voting for the resolution "had they been present," and
one absent member "probably against the resolution." Id. at 783.
25. Id. at 782 (listing Madison among the "yeas" on the resolution).
26. Rakove, supra note 16, at 364-65.
27. Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation 149 (2000)
(noting that "Federalists referred to Madison as 'the general'... calling Jefferson, his
mentor secluded at Monticello, 'the generalissimo"').
28. Lynch, supra note 10, at 145 (remarking on Madison's caution in making
constitutional arguments over the Jay Treaty and the willingness of younger
Republicans to make them).
29. 5 Annals of Cong. 426 (1796) (statement of Rep. Livingston).
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effect, or refusing it their sanction."3 Madison was reluctant to make
this argument, but as the Republican leader in Congress, and as one of
the foremost authorities on the Constitution, his silence would have
spoken volumes.3 His remarks were principally, though not explicitly,
directed at countering the arguments made by Hamilton in his public
essays as "Camillus," and by Washington in his response to the
House's request for papers relating to the Jay Treaty.3 2  Because
Washington's and Hamilton's positions remained consistent with the
Federalist position, it is easier to comprehend Madison by examining
Washington and Hamilton first.
The House voted sixty-two to thirty-seven in favor of Livingston's
resolution on March 24, and Washington's response arrived six days
later.33 Washington refused to turn over papers relating to the Jay
Treaty, emphasizing that if the Constitution placed upon him such a
duty he would have readily complied: 4  He further addressed the
incidental question of the House's role in treaty-making:
Having been a member of the General Convention, and knowing
the principles on which the Constitution was formed, I have ever
entertained but one opinion on this subject... that the power of
making Treaties is exclusively vested in the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate... and that every Treaty so
made, and promulgated, thenceforward becomes the law of the
land.35
30. Id. at 427-28. The inclusion of the House's impeachment power as a reason
for the resolution was a tactical mistake by Livingston, for it placed the Republicans
in the position of tacitly implicating Washington-the most popular and respected
person in the country-personally, and the public response in favor of Washington's
refusal was the result. See Lynch, supra note 10, at 156; Charles, supra note 10, at 47.
31. Lynch, supra note 10, at 149 (remarking on necessity of Madison's
participation as "his party's resident constitutional expert"); Rakove, supra note 16, at
358 (noting "Madison had misgivings about [the Republican] strategy").
32. Hamilton's essays, collectively entitled The Defence, were published during
late 1795 through January 1796. His arguments in support of the treaty on
constitutional grounds were published in the last three essays. See Alexander
Hamilton, The Defence Nos. XXXVI-XXXVIII (Jan. 1796), reprinted in 20 The
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 3, 13, 22 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1974)
[hereinafter The Hamilton Papers]. Washington transmitted his response to
Livingston's resolution on March 30, 1796. 5 Annals of Cong. 760-62 (1796).
33. 5 Annals of Cong. 759-60 (1796).
34. Washington pointedly stated that he had, in fact, complied with that duty by
laying the treaty papers before the Senate when the treaty was presented "for their
consideration and advice." Id. at 760-61.
35. 5 Annals of Cong. 761 (1796) (message of Pres. Washington). By referring to
Washington's use of the debates in the Convention, this Note does not argue an
"original understanding" of the treaty power. Rather, it demonstrates Washington's
consistency with the Federalist movement's proposal. Of course, within the context
of the Founding, the original understanding in the Philadelphia Convention and in
the ratification debates, and the Federalist proposal are essentially the same.
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Washington also argued that this interpretation was in keeping with
the view of the State Conventions. 6 In particular, he noted that the
Antifederalists took this view, for they had objected that the approval
of a treaty of commerce should require the consent of two-thirds of
the whole Senate, rather than two-thirds of the Senators present.,
Further, Washington pointed out that the exclusion of the House from
the treaty power had been a concession to the smaller states, which in
the Senate would have an equal voice in approving treaties.-  Finally,
the "Journals of the General Convention" recorded that a proposal
"that no Treaty should be binding on the United States which was not
ratified by a law" was "explicitly rejected."39 The President concluded
that "a just regard to the Constitution and to the duty of my office...
forbid a compliance with your request."'
While Washington's message to the House was a serious blow to the
Republican leadership,4" it was by no means the first.4 2 Hamilton's
The Defence, written under the pseudonym "Camillus," was one of
the earliest, most influential, and most extensive series of editorials in
support of the Jay Treaty.43 Hamilton argued that the treaty power
was plenary, except that a treaty cannot change the Constitution. He
also distinguished between the legislative power, vested in Congress,
and the power to make treaties, vested in the President and Senate.'
He emphasized that the President was empowered to make treaties
(as opposed, perhaps, to a power merely to negotiate treaties). '
Hamilton argued that the treaty power was not legislative in
character, because legislative acts were "rules binding upon all
persons and things over which the nation has jurisdiction."47 Treaties,
rather, were agreements "establishing rules binding upon two or more
nations."'  Legislation could not bind other nations, or regulate
Americans when they trade in another nation's jurisdiction. 9
Congress' power to regulate trade with foreign nations allowed it to
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id at 762.
41. Combs, supra note 12, at 177 (discussing Federalist party and Republican
reactions to message).
42. Id. at 163 (discussing Federalist party response to Republican criticism once
treaty was made public in July of 1795).
43. Id. Hamilton was assisted by contributions from Rufus King. Id.
44. Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVI, supra note 32, at 6. Hamilton also noted
a "natural" exception, "which respects abuses of authority in palpable and extreme
cases," but noted that this exception did not relate to the separation of powers issue.
Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted).
45. Id. at 8-10.
46. Id. at 6.
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id. (emphasis in original).
49. Id.
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establish regulations respecting trade only within United States
territory. 0  "[T]he proposition that the legislative powers of
Congress" were limitations on the President's and Senate's power to
make treaties, Hamilton concluded, was a "fallacy." 51
Hamilton attacked the Republican opposition with arguments made
by Antifederalists during ratification. The Antifederalists had argued
that the treaty power should be vested in the legislative authority, or
that treaties should not be "supreme laws."52 Federalists had denied
that the treaty power should be vested in the legislature, but rather
argued that the House "might check by its influence the President and
Senate on the subject of treaties. 53 Hamilton also noted that the
Articles of Confederation had restricted the Confederation Congress
from entering into commercial treaties that restricted the states from
imposing imposts or duties. 4 Since the Treaty Clause contained no
such proviso, he reasoned, it "is more comprehensive.., and is
fortified by the express declaration that its acts shall be valid
notwithstanding the constitution or laws of any state. '55
On March 10, 1796, Madison offered his first constitutional
arguments against the Jay Treaty. 6 Madison reasoned that, although
the House was not seeking to encroach upon the constitutional
authority of the President and Senate, it must retain its discretion and
judgment when considering a treaty that encompasses powers
expressly delegated to the legislative branch. 7 Only this construction
"would best reconcile the several parts of the [Constitution] with each
other, and be most consistent with its general spirit and object. 58 The
50. Id. at 9.
51. Id. at 10.
52. Hamilton, The Defence XXXVIII, supra note 32, at 22, 23 & n.4, 24 & n.
(emphasis omitted) (referencing The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority
of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents, George Mason's
Objections to The Constitution of Government, and the debates in the Virginia
Convention). Mason's Objections were published in Virginia, Massachusetts, and
Connecticut, though each printing was not identical. 3 Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution 487 (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter
Documentary History]. The version in the Connecticut Courant, published on
November 26, 1787, drew a response by "A Landholder" similar to Washington's
argument in support of the treaty.
Mr. Mason deems the President and Senate's power to make treaties
dangerous because they become laws of the land. If the President... had
this power.., alone, as in England and other nations is the case, would the
danger be less? Or is the representative branch suited to the making of
treaties which are often intricate and require much negotiation and secrecy?
"A Landholder", No. VI (Dec. 10, 1787), reprinted in 3 id. at 487,490.
53. Hamilton, The Defence XXXVIII, supra note 32, at 24 n. (emphasis in
original).
54. Id. at 26.
55. Id.
56. Rakove, supra note 16, at 358.
57. 5 Annals of Cong. 487-88 (1796) (statement of Rep. Madison).
58. Id. at 488.
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Supremacy Clause5 9 he argued, bound the states to obey treaties, but
did not bind the Congress.'
The force of this reasoning is not obviated by saying, that the
President and Senate would only pledge the public faith, and that
the agency of Congress would be necessary to carry it into
operation. For, what difference does this make, if the obligation
imposed be, as is alleged, a Constitutional one; if Congress have no
will but to obey, and if to disobey be treason and rebellion against
the constituted authorities? 61
Madison was broadly construing the text and structure of the
Constitution, and did not refer to the debates either in Philadelphia,
the state ratifying conventions, or the Federalist.' The reason for this
was obvious in light of Hamilton's arguments in The Defence.' When
Washington's message refusing to produce Jay's instructions and
correspondence was reported to the House, the full implications of
Madison's arguments became clear.
Washington's refusal cheered Federalists while demoralizing many
Republicans.' Madison's early hesitancy, however, rather than
increasing, was removed. 65  "The effect of this reprehensible
measure," Madison wrote Jefferson, "is not likely to correspond with
the calculation of its authors. 66  The President's message pushed
Madison to orchestrate the two resolutions introduced by
Representative Blount, which reaffirmed the House's power over
treaties and its authority to request documents from the President
59. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof;, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
60. 5 Annals of Cong. 488 (1796) (statement of Rep. Madison). Madison begs the
question if a treaty is ratified, but the House refuses to accept it, are the states still
bound to comply with the treaty's terms?
61. Id. at 491.
62. Rakove, supra note 16, at 358-59.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 48-55.
64. Combs, supra note 12, at 177.
65. Id. According to Professor Ellis, Jefferson later concluded that Jay's Treaty
had passed "because of the gigantic prestige of Washington, 'the one man who
outweighs them all in influence over the people."' Ellis, supra note 27, at 138.
Jefferson "quoted a famous line from Washington's favorite play, Joseph Addison's
Cato, and applied it to Washington himself: 'a curse on his virtues, they've undone his
country."' Id. at 138-39. Jefferson wrote to James Monroe in July of 1796 that, though
the High-Federalists had succeeded in the Jay Treaty controversy, -nothing can
support them but the Colossus of the President's merits with the people, and the
moment he retires.., his successor, if a Monocrat, will be overborne by the
republican sense." Id. at 143 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
66. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 4, 1796), in 16 The
Madison Papers, supra note 20, at 286.
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without specific reasons.67 Madison did not respond to the substance
of the issue, but repudiated (respectfully) Washington's reliance on
(1) his memory, (2) the Journals of the Convention, and (3) the
records of the state conventions.6 Madison stated that it was
impossible for one member of the Philadelphia Convention to recall
the intentions of the whole, and pointed out that some Framers
viewed the Jay Treaty as unconstitutional. 69 Admitting that the
Journals were a more reliable source, he argued that the
understanding of the Convention should not persuade, because the
Constitution was "nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity
were breathed into it... through the several State Conventions." 0
Madison argued that the debates in the state conventions
demonstrated that the treaty power was understood as analogous to
the design in Great Britain.71  In any case, the debates "as
published ... contained internal evidence in abundance of chasms and
misconceptions of what was said."" Madison admitted that the
amendments proposed by the state conventions were "better
authority."73 However, he used these amendments, amendments that
were proposed but never adopted, to support the Republican
position.74 In particular he stressed a proposal that stated "[t]hat all
power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority,
without the consent of the Representatives of the people in the
Legislature, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be
exercised."75  The state conventions had placed the proposed
amendment in a "Declaration of Rights," which to Madison indicated
that the conventions "considered it as a fundamental, inviolable...
principle.., that no power could supersede a law without the consent
of the Representatives of the people in the Legislature."76 Yet there
was one power that could, and Madison had argued as much-the
people were the supreme power, and it was their "voice" which had
67. Id. at 286, 287 n.6 (describing Madison's motivations); see supra notes xxiii-xxv
and accompanying text.
68. 5 Annals of Cong. 774-80 (1796) (statement of Rep. Madison). Madison was
careful to stress that it was regrettable "that the existing difference of opinion
[between the President and the House] had arisen," and that the "most respectful
delicacy" was due the "other constituted authority." Id. at 772.
69. Id. at 775-76.
70. Id. at 776.
71. Id. at 777. However, Madison demonstrated this point through analogy to the
pardoning power-a wholly irrelevant argument that suggests Madison's uneasiness
with the issue. See Rakove, supra note 16, at 363.
72. 5 Annals of Cong. 777 (1796) (statement of Rep. Madison).
73. Id.
74. Id. ("The amendments proposed by the several [State] Conventions... would
be found, on a general view, to favor the sense of the Constitution which had
prevailed in this House."). The same or similar language was used in amendments
proposed by Virginia, North Carolina, and Maryland. Id. at 777-78.
75. Id. at 778 (quoting Declaration of Rights proposed by Virginia Convention).
76. Id.
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spoken through the state conventions.' Further, Madison dismissed
the fact that these amendments were deemed necessary to correct
deficiencies in the Constitution itself, and that these amendments
were never adopted." The inconsistencies in Madison's arguments,
however, did not stop there.
Prior to this debate, Madison had been fairly consistent in
advancing narrow constructions of the Constitution, and often relied
on the records of the debates for support.79 As a leading member of
both the Philadelphia Convention and the Virginia Convention, and
as a Representative who had frequently turned to the records of those
conventions, Madison was the last person in Congress who should
have been repudiating those records.' The embarrassment Madison
felt over the inconsistencies was significant, and contributed to his
decision to leave Congress.8'
Madison's arguments suggest that he was attempting to gain a
higher lawmaking tier on behalf of a Republican movement. In
Blount's resolution, the Republicans had declared a proposal for
constitutional reform. Rising to support it, Madison "hoped that it
would be discussed on both sides without either levity, intemperance,
or illiberality"2-in other words, with deliberation.
If there were any question which could make a serious appeal to the
dispassionate judgment, it must be one which respected the meaning
77. See id. at 776.
78. See Rakove, supra note 16, at 363-64.
79. See Lynch, supra note 10, at 155 (discussing debate over national bank and
spending power); Rakove, supra note 16, at 350-56 (discussing debate over Bank of
United States and Washington's neutrality proclamation of 1793). The debate in 1793
over the extent of presidential powers in foreign affairs is particularly relevant. When
France declared war on Great Britain in 1793, the question regarding American
obligations under its Treaty of Alliance with France arose. Lynch, supra note 10, at
114. Jefferson, favoring France but accepting the necessity of American neutrality,
suggested to Washington that Congress should declare the nation at peace. Id. at 114-
15. The problem was that Congress was not in session. Id. at 115. Hamilton favored
an immediate proclamation American neutrality by the President, which Washington
eventually agreed to and issued. Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 1, at 338-39. The
proclamation was not immediately popular, because Americans still resented Great
Britain-a remnant of the Revolution-and favored France, due both to French
assistance in the Revolution and the popularity of the French Revolution. Lynch,
supra note 10, at 114. Hamilton argued as "Pacificus" in favor of broad presidential
powers in foreign affairs, despite Congress' express power to declare war and its
implicit companion, the power to decide not to declare war. Id. at 116-19. At
Jefferson's prompting, Madison answered Hamilton in his "Helvidius" essays, in
which he argued for a strict construction of the Constitution, which would have
required congressional approval for any military action, including a determination of
a state of war or peace. Id. at 121-23. However, because the decision had to be made
while Congress was out of session (and before it could be called into an emergency
session), a strict construction of the Constitution was impractical. Id. at 115, 121-23.
80. See Lynch, supra note 10, at 159 (noting that Madison had "almost work[ed]
himself to death, to preserve the debates of the Constitutional Convention[]").
81. Id. at 159-60; Rakove, supra note 16, at 364.
82. 5 Annals of Cong. 772 (1796) (statement of Rep. Madison).
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of the Constitution; and if any Constitutional question could make
the appeal with peculiar solemnity, it must be in a case like the
present, where two of the constituted authorities interpreted
differently the extent of their respective powers.83
If the President and Congress could not resolve their disagreement,
there were two possible remedies:
[I]f the difference cannot be adjusted by friendly conference and
mutual concession, the sense of the constituent body, brought into
the Government through the ordinary elective channels, may supply
a remedy. And if this resource should fail, there remains.., that
provident article in the Constitution itself, by which an avenue is
always open to the sovereignty of the people, for explanations or
amendments, as they might be found indispensable.'
Madison asked for popular support for the resolution during the next
elections as a remedy on the "Constitutional question," not simply on
the question of the Jay Treaty. Notably, the possibility of amendment
via Article V had already been raised by Virginia (at Madison's
prompting), and rejected by nine other states.8 5 The only avenue
remaining for the Republicans was the Presidency.
C. The Veil of Deliberation and Consensus: Jay's Treaty, Party
Politics, and the Election of 1796
While party politics played a significant role in American foreign
policy during the 1790s, it is more accurate to state that foreign policy
played a significant role in party politics.86 Both perspectives have a
claim to legitimacy in the Jay Treaty controversy. Republican
opposition to Jay's Treaty was strong because they disagreed on
principle with a policy drawing America closer to Great Britain, and
thus away from republican France.' The instigation of the
constitutional crisis in the House, however, was not a principled
attempt to change the constitutional process of treaty-making.M
Madison and Jefferson understood, because they had helped make it
happen, that the key to control over foreign policy was control of the
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
86. See Charles, supra note 10, at 122 (noting "events growing out of our foreign
relations had a decisive influence in determining the course of the two parties");
Combs. supra note 12, at 172 (discussing effect of the Jay Treaty on "party
development"); Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 1, at 415 ("The outpouring of popular
feeling over the Jay Treaty... was more directly responsible than anything else for
the full emergence of political parties in America .... ).
87. See Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 1, at 441-42; Ellis, supra note 19, at 188-89
("[A]s Jefferson saw it, the Jay Treaty was a repudiation of the Declaration of
Independence....")
88. See infra text accompanying notes civ-cxiii (discussing Republican motivations
for House debate).
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presidency.' The Jay Treaty presented an opportunity to rally
popular support around a pro-France party platform in the
presidential elections in late 1796.10 Once the Senate consented to and
the President ratified the treaty, the only forum from which to build
that support was the House.
Jefferson and Madison were concerned about the foreign policy of
the Washington administration, which in their view was connecting
America with Britain and distancing it from France, America's
ideological ally in Europe.9' Beginning in 1789, Madison lobbied for
retaliatory measures against Great Britain.Y2 For example, the tariff
and tonnage bill introduced in 1789 would have taxed at a higher rate
ships from nations without a commercial treaty with the United States
than American ships paid.93 The most important of these was Great
Britain.94 Madison intended to use commercial pressure to persuade
Britain toward a more favorable treaty.95 These attempts to injure
Britain through trade were stymied principally by the opposition of
Hamilton and Washington. Professor Joseph Charles related that
"Hamilton cemented the Federalist group in Congress, and gave it
such a pointed efficiency that even when the majority was in fact
made up of Jeffersonians, he was able to dominate it and manoeuver
it, as is proved by the long discussions and final votes on the Jay
treaty."'96 "From that point forward," Professor Lance Banning stated,
"[Madison] was more and more inclined to use the legislatures of the
states, as well as public meetings, Congress, and the press, as
instruments for shaping and enforcing popular opinion." '
Madison's attempt to block the Jay Treaty through the Virginia
legislature failed. The Senate ratified the treaty on June 24, 1795, but
rejected one article that granted American ships limited access to the
89. The expansion of presidential powers began during Washington's first term,
when Jefferson was Secretary of State and Madison his ally in Congress. Madison's
assistance came in the removal debate, where he argued that the President has the
power to remove executive officers. Rakove, supra note 16, at 347-50. Jefferson had
advised Washington that the House was obliged to pass appropriations necessary to
carry into effect the treaty with Algiers, though out of practicality Jefferson had
advised Washington to obtain the House's consent prior to ratifying the treaty. Lynch,
supra note 10, at 143.
90. Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 1, at 441-42; Lynch, supra note 10, at 146; see
also Ellis, supra note 19, at 188-89 (stating the Jay Treaty "endorsed a pro-English
version of American neutrality, just the opposite of Jefferson's pro-French version of
'fair neutrality').
91. Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 1, at 316-17.
92. Combs, supra note 12, at 31.
93. 1d.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Charles, supra note 10, at 115-16 (internal quotations omitted).
97. Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding
of the Federal Republic 380 (1995).
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British West Indies.9s Assuming that the Senate would be required to
approve the treaty again once the British had learned of the
conditional ratification, Republicans began a petition drive, hoping
that popular disapproval would convince Washington or the Senate to
refuse the treaty.99  Madison drafted petitions to the Virginia
legislature seeking its condemnation of the treaty "in virtue of their
constitutional right of appointing Senators."'0 The Republican-
controlled Virginia legislature proposed several constitutional
amendments, one of which would have required approval by the
House of all treaties."1 Combs explained the effect:
The Republican campaign backfired. South Carolina, Kentucky,
and Georgia did pass resolutions similar to those of Virginia, but
nine other states including Republican North Carolina rejected
them. The Federalists were elated. "That a great change has been
brought in the public mind, with respect to this Treaty within the last
two months, is apparent to every one," Washington wrote. 0
The British approved the Senate version of the Jay Treaty (without
Article 12) and returned it to Washington, who declared it in effect
February 29, 1796, without reconsideration by the Senate."°
Madison's gambit in the Virginia legislature was moot. The only
avenue remaining to attack the Jay Treaty was the House, and the
only way to raise the question in the House was to trigger the
constitutional crisis.
By continuing the debate over the Jay Treaty, Republicans were
attempting to keep the issue of American foreign policy before the
people. Washington's retirement was widely anticipated by the
98. Combs, supra note 12, at 161.
99. Popular disapproval of the treaty began even before its terms were known. Id.
at 159-60. Republicans encouraged this discontent through petitions, pamphlets, and
public meetings. Charles, supra note 10, at 108. The popular campaign had little
influence on Washington, however, who withheld the treaty for four months before
submitting it to the Senate. Combs, supra note 12, at 160. Washington responded to
public addresses asking him to refuse the treaty dismissively, if at all. Banning, supra
note 97, at 381. Moreover, public sentiment slowly shifted in favor of the treaty,
partly as a result of Washington's endorsement of it, and partly due to fortuitous
events. Id. The economy was improving in 1796. Lynch, supra note 10, at 144.
Anthony Wayne's victory over the Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers made
settlement of the Northwest Territory much safer if the British left the northwestern
forts. Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 1, at 438-39. Finally, Spain, concerned about
the commercial alliance the Jay Treaty potentially implied, agreed to grant Americans
free navigation of the Mississippi River. Id. at 439-40 (discussing Treaty of San
Lorenzo). Despite the growing popular acceptance of Jay's Treaty, Republicans
apparently still believed the majority of Americans favored their position since they
continued to oppose the treaty in the House even after Washington's message
refusing to comply with the House's request for papers. Lynch, supra note 10, at 158.
100. Banning, supra note 47, at 381 (quoting Madison).
101. Combs, supra note 12, at 172.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 174. Washington had received copies of the British ratification in
January. but refused to lay it before the House until he received the originals. Id.
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political leadership in both parties."" Republicans wanted to associate
the anti-British sentiments of the people with the proponents of the
Jay Treaty in the hopes that the Federalist party would pay the price
in the 1796 election.0 5 Madison had reason to expect such a result in
late 1795, when he wrote to Jefferson that the Pennsylvania state
elections turned on a treaty/anti-treaty division, and the anti-treaty
candidates were the winners."w Similarly, Madison reported that
Republicans had gained a two-thirds majority in both houses of the
Delaware legislature. 0 7 The popular support the Republicans enjoyed
in 1795, however, had cooled considerably by February of 1796.'1
The reason the Republicans failed to recognize, or ignored, this
change in attitude was the unifying effect the Jay Treaty had on the
Republican party."° As Elkins and McKitrick argued:
Opposition to the treaty had become a party commitment and had
taken on a life of its own, in some degree independent of the ebb
and flow of popular sentiment, even though a great billow of
popular sentiment was what had ratified the commitment in the first
place. Nothing up to then had brought such a unifying surge; public
feeling and the partisan impulse had seemed in total harmony in the
summer of 1795. And for the spokesmen of Republicanism it was
pure principle, as pure as such things could be.""
An issue that forged sectional interests into a national foundation for
the Republican party was a difficult one to discard. Madison had
attempted to create such a unified opposition in early 1794 when he
proposed discriminatory measures against Great Britain."' With the
unity provided by the Jay Treaty:
[T]here was something else, something few quite knew how to
manage even in their own minds, so novel and hitherto so remote an
idea had it been: the possibility of taking actual control of the
national government. The Federalists... were not really wrong in
claiming that the real issue taking shape in the House ... was
whether the Republican party, without "the vital nourishment it
104. Washington had written to Hamilton in June of 1796 that his decision to retire
was "very well understood, and is industriously propagated, privately." Letter from
George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (June 26, 1796), in 20 The Hamilton
Papers, supra note 32, at 239 (emphasis in original).
105. Ellis, supra note 19, at 189-90; Lynch, supra note 10, at 160.
106. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 18, 1795), in 16 The
Madison Papers, supra note 20, at 105.
107. Id Federalist Gunning Bedford, however, had been elected governor. Id.
108. See supra note 99 (discussing events that changed public opinion).
109. Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 1, at 441-42.
110. Id.
111. Charles, supra note 10, at 99 ("The Republicans regarded his resolutions as an
effort to regulate commerce with an eye to the economic interests of every section.").
The resolutions were "sidetracked," but gained enough support in New England and
the mid-Atlantic states to encourage the Federalists to resolve the trade issues with
Great Britain by treaty, thus taking the issue out of the House of Representatives. Id.
at 101-03. Or, at least, so they thought.
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derived from a deadly, implacable, and everlasting enmity to...
[Britain] would be able to sustain itself," or in hinting ... that the
Republicans' not-too-distant object was to bring Thomas Jefferson
to the presidency. 112
Thus, Thomas Blount's resolution on the House's discretionary
authority over treaties touching upon Congressional powers can be
seen as a political tactic to throw the Jay Treaty into the 1796
elections, just as Madison expressly urged in his supporting speech."3
That "spirit of amity" and "mutual deference and concession,"
referred to by Washington in his letter to the Confederation Congress
in 1787,114 and necessary in achieving the consensus required in higher
lawmaking, was sorely lacking in the Fourth Congress. Professor
Combs wrote:
Peace, trade expansion, and favorable borders-these were the goals
that united the decision-makers of post-revolutionary America.
But these leaders remained united only so long as they could avoid
assigning priorities to their foreign policy goals.... Since the
Articles of Confederation left the United States without the power
to achieve any of these goals, there was no need to choose between
them." 5
Under the Constitution, it became possible to achieve these goals, and
the consensus slowly fell apart. According to Professor Charles, party
regularity increased from fifty-eight percent in 1790 to ninety-three
percent in 1796.116 Though party loyalty could have achieved the
consensus higher lawmaking requires, the Republicans achieved
consensus not on the merits of the constitutional proposal, but on the
party interest in capturing the presidency in order to control national
policy on the struggle between France and Great Britain.
In the constitutional debate over the House's role in treaty-making,
the Federalists had retained the approval of nine states, those that
refused to consider Virginia's proposed amendments,' and the
support of two-thirds of the Senate," 8 in addition to the weight of
112. Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 1, at 442 (footnotes omitted).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 23, 84.
114. Letter of the Convention to Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), in Clinton Rossiter,
1787: The Grand Convention 342 (Mentor ed. 1966). Washington also referred to it
in his message to Congress refusing to turn over the Jay Treaty papers. 5 Annals of
Cong. 761 (1796) (message of Pres. Washington).
115. Combs, supra note 12, at 16.
116. "The increasing sharpness of the party division stands out most clearly if we
measure it by showing the decline of no-party voting." Charles, supra note 10, at 93.
In a footnote, Charles explained, "These are the figures if we regard voting with one
party 66 2/3% of the time as the test of party regularity. If to be a regular party man a
member must have voted 75% of the time with one party, the figures [for no-party
voting] are 54% to 14% for the same sessions." Id. at 93 n.2.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
118. The senate narrowly approved the Jay Treaty, by twenty to ten, along party
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Washington and Hamilton (who according to Jefferson was also a
"colossus"' 119 in his own right). The Republicans gained the support of
the four states that proposed amendments similar to the House
resolution,1" and nearly two-thirds of the House of Representatives.
The public citizens involved in this constitutional debate were nearly
split, which reflected the results in the presidential election of 1796.
John Adams, the Federalist party candidate, beat Jefferson by three
electoral votes.122 However, Jefferson garnered more votes than the
Federalist candidate for Vice-President, Charles Pinckney. -' Thus,
the leader of the Republican party became the Vice-President under
Federalist President Adams.
lines. Rakove, supra note 16, at 356-57.
119. Jefferson wrote to Madison about the "'Camillus" essays, -Hamilton is really a
colossus to the antirepublican party. Without numbers, he is an host within himself."
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 21, 1795), in 16 The Madison
Papers, supra note 20, at 88-89.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
121. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. When the treaty appropriations
bill was finally voted on, the Republicans lost that majority. The appropriations bill
passed the Committee of the Whole by a split forty-nine to forty-nine vote, which was
broken in favor of the treaty by Republican Speaker of the House Frederick
Muhlenberg. The House then implemented the Jay Treaty by a vote of fifty-one to
forty-eght. Combs, supra note 12, at 186-87.
122. Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 1, at 518-19.
123. Id. at 519.
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